Proposal For A New Defense Strategy for Lithuania
Lithuania's current defense is overly reliant on external help — with little to no Plan B. In a world increasingly dictated by strength, this represents a substantial vulnerability. To address that, we are proposing a radical paradigm shift based on the French deterrence model.
In the aftermath of the Second World War — and after three devastating wars with Germany — France committed to a massive investment in its defense to ensure that, once and for all, its sovereignty would never be questioned ever again. From that emerged the development of the nuclear weapons program, ensuring any aggressor would suffer catastrophic consequences.
We seek to replicate the same logic to Lithuanian defense, at an identical cost as a share of GDP as France's investments in deterrence. Recent advances in AI, autonomous systems, and drone warfare have fundamentally transformed what a small nation can achieve independently to safeguard its sovereignty.
Our 200 defense initiatives are designed exactly for that: to guarantee unbearable costs to any aggressor — and, once and for all, secure Lithuania's full sovereignty through strength, not dependency.
Defense Initiatives
Distributed Layered Air Defense Network
The Iran war of 28 February to 8 April 2026 broke the Western air-defence model: Lithuania can neither buy enough premium interceptors nor afford to fire them at cheap drones. The only sustainable answer is a layered network of many low-cost effectors.
Distributed Mass MANPADS — Riflemen Union, Territorial Defense, and Critical Infrastructure
Field roughly 2,100 shoulder-fired and tripod-mounted air-defense missiles across regular brigades, uniformed reservists, and protected sites, to deny low-altitude airspace to Russian helicopters and drones in the years before larger systems arrive.
Counter-Drone Interceptor Swarm — Low-Cost Kinetic Tier
Lithuania has bought the high-end air defence; what is missing is a low-cost interceptor that can absorb the volume of mass Russian drone attacks without emptying million-dollar magazines.
Defensive Drone Interceptor Fleet (Sub-€5K Consumable Layer)
A sub-€5K consumable interceptor layer to absorb Geran-2 attrition and Gerbera decoys, freeing Lithuania's higher-tier missiles for the jet-powered Geran-3 that small drones cannot catch.
Mobile Tethered Low-Altitude Surveillance Network
A mobile network of small tethered drones at 100-200 metres altitude that watches the airspace below 500 metres — the band where Russian FPV strike drones, Orlan reconnaissance drones, and Geran-2 cruise drones operate, and where ground radar cannot see.
Defense-Coded Energy Infrastructure Hardening (MoD Gap-Fill on Litgrid €382M)
A defense-specific gap-fill of about €182M on the existing September 2025 Litgrid hardening program, focused on what only the Ministry of Defence can do — transformer reserves, military microgrids, territorial-guard doctrine, and cyber repair.
Baltic Spy Satellites
Satellite reconnaissance for the Baltics — start by buying priority access to Germany's new Lithuania-focused constellation, then add national satellites only where the gap is real.
Offensive Cyber Effects Branch — LTCYBERCOM
Lithuania's defensive Cyber Defence Command stood up on 1 January 2025; the missing piece is an offensive-effects branch that can contribute named cyber strikes to allied operations the way France, the United Kingdom, and the United States already do.
Baltic SIGINT and Electronic Intelligence Enhancement
Lithuania shares a 273-kilometre land border with Russian Kaliningrad — a target-rich electromagnetic environment its military intelligence can exploit to feed allied targeting, if existing capacity is augmented and integrated into NATO.
Constitutional Continuity of Government Reform
A single Russian salvo on central Vilnius could incapacitate both the President and the Speaker of the Seimas — the only two officeholders the Constitution authorises to exercise presidential powers — creating serious ambiguity over the chief-of-command role and the constitutionally clearest pathway for collective-defence requests to NATO.
Codify and Oversight-Harden Fast Defense Procurement
Lithuania already buys defence equipment fast on a case-by-case basis, but has no statute, no central agency, and no anti-corruption guard rails — leaving every minister exposed to a repeat of the 2024 Anušauskas bribery scandal.
Baltic Sea Mine Warfare and Chokepoint Denial Capability
Lithuania has already signed into the 10-nation Naval Mines Cooperation framework and the Finland-led joint Blocker mine procurement; the task now is to define what Lithuania adds inside it — an expanded minehunter fleet, a credible national mine stockpile, and the legal authority to use it.
Enabling Capabilities
Baltic Allied Training Center Hub (BATCH)
Baltic Defense Industry Consortium
Civil-Military Coordination Center Study
Civilian Drone Pilot Reserve Registry Study
National Critical Skills Database for Defense Mobilization Study
Lithuanian Defense Export Support Study
Lithuanian Defense Innovation Unit Study
Defense Media Engagement and Strategic Communication Study
Lithuanian Diaspora Defense Engagement Study
Ukraine Conflict Lessons Learned Analysis Center Study
Volunteer Technical Corps Feasibility Study
National Cyber Defence Talent Pipeline Study
Defense Research Fellows and Scholars Program Study
Military Psychology and Combat Resilience Program
Lithuanian National Defense Institute Study (IHEDN Model)
Rocket and Missile Engineering Talent Development Program
Military Technical Specialist Retention Program Study
Technical Intelligence Exploitation Training Program
Veteran Reintegration into Defense Industry Program
Building Association Emergency Power Generator Mandate
Decoy and Deception Systems Study
Distributed Acoustic Sensor Network Study
Integrated Border Surveillance Sensor Network
Lithuanian Open-Source Intelligence Centre Study
From the Field
Lithuania's 'One Month' Defense Debate Reveals a Dangerous Mindset
Lithuanian parliament debated whether the country can defend itself for 'at least one month' without US support. That question reveals the core problem: the entire political class frames defense as survival time before rescue. One month is not a strategy — it's a countdown to capitulation.
- ▸Opposition lawmakers propose Lithuania should be able to defend itself independently for 'at least one month' — framing defense as survival time before rescue
- ▸The government maintains plans exist but are classified — no public debate on actual capability
- ▸The Iran war destroyed the rescue assumption: the US withdrew from the UAE rather than defend it under fire
First Lessons from the Iran War for Lithuanian Defense
Three days into the US-Israel campaign against Iran, the war is rewriting core assumptions about modern conflict. The lessons for Lithuania's defense are urgent: interceptor math is broken, GPS denial is real, and decentralization is survival.
- ▸Coalition interceptor stocks depleting 2x faster than planned — 10 days instead of 20
- ▸GPS jamming in the Strait of Hormuz is degrading JDAMs, cruise missiles, and drone ops
- ▸Iran's decentralized C2 survived 3 days of coalition strikes with operational tempo intact
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