Executive Summary
Ukraine has shown that inflatable and electronic decoys priced at 3,000 to 30,000 euros routinely absorb Russian missiles priced at hundreds of thousands to several million each. Open-source assessments by RUSI and the Institute for the Study of War credit Ukrainian decoys with diverting a substantial share of Russian strike allocation against HIMARS, Patriot, S-300 and FH-77 howitzers. Lithuania has no publicly documented decoy stockpile, while a Russian Ministry of Defence target list circulated in April 2026 names Vilnius among 21 European sites. Russian reconnaissance is multi-layered (Tu-214R aircraft, satellites, drones, signals intelligence), so a credible decoy must imitate a real system in visual, radar, thermal and electromagnetic bands at once. Production lines exist in Czechia (Inflatech) and Poland. The recommended next step is a Ministry of National Defence study, with industry input, scoping which assets warrant decoy coverage and how a programme would size within the 2026 defence budget of 4.79 billion euros. Final scale is for Lithuania to determine.
The Problem
Russian long-range fires are inventory-limited and target-selected. Each Iskander, Kalibr or Kh-101 missile is a finite resource pre-assigned against a known list of fixed sites: airfields, air-defence radars, command posts, fuel depots, bridges and rail nodes. An April 2026 Russian Ministry of Defence target list naming Vilnius among 21 European sites confirms that Lithuanian high-value assets are pre-coordinated. Russian reconnaissance is layered: Tu-214R signals-intelligence aircraft, Bear-J maritime patrol, Liana and Arkon-2 satellites, reconnaissance drones, and ground signals intelligence cross-check imagery before a strike package launches.
Lithuania has no publicly documented decoy or deception stockpile at the scale Ukraine has demonstrated. Real systems (NASAMS launchers, radars, command posts, the 48 Merops AS-3 short-range air-defence systems approved by the Lithuanian Cabinet on 22 April 2026) are presented to Russian sensors without false-target overlay. Every Russian missile that finds a real target is a missile that did not waste itself on a 5,000-euro inflatable.
Without action: A finite Russian missile inventory finds real Lithuanian targets at full hit rate. Air defence, command nodes and logistics are degraded in the opening salvos rather than in week three of a campaign.
Lithuanian Context
Lithuania faces an adversary whose own doctrine of maskirovka treats deception as a core operational art, so any Lithuanian decoy programme must out-deceive the Russian sensor stack rather than match Cold-War-era Western standards. Small geography concentrates real targets, which makes signature dispersal more important and signature fidelity more demanding than in larger countries.