Executive Summary
Modern wars run on specialist skills as much as rifles. Ukraine spent early 2022 searching for trauma surgeons, translators, drone pilots, and truck drivers; surgeons ended up in infantry while hospitals advertised for surgeons. Finland, Switzerland, and Israel avoid that delay because every adult of military age sits in a register tagged with civilian skills. Lithuania has the National Population Register, the Riflemen Union roster (about 17,000), and conscript files, but no skill-tagged index a mobilization officer can query in minutes. A critical-skills database would close the gap. The recommended next step is a feasibility study by the Ministry of National Defence with the State Data Protection Inspectorate and the Seimas, covering priority categories (medical, engineering, software, drone operation, welder, Russian / Belarusian / Ukrainian linguists, sapper), legal authority under the General Data Protection Regulation, adaptation of Estonia's X-Road backbone, and hardening against targeting lists like the one Russia's defence ministry published on 15 April 2026. Structure is for Lithuania to determine.
The Problem
A Russian offensive against the Baltic states would force Lithuania to mobilize the active reserve, the Riflemen Union, and a wider pool of civilians with critical skills inside days, not weeks. The country sits 35km from the Belarus border and 306km from Kaliningrad; a missile salvo on Vilnius command nodes would arrive in 102 to 175 seconds, and a cyber attack of the kind that wiped two Polish power stations on 29 to 30 December 2025 would likely come first. In that window, a mobilization officer needs to know within minutes how many trauma surgeons, electrical engineers, fluent Russian speakers, and heavy-truck drivers exist in the country, where they live, and how to reach them.
Lithuania holds three relevant datasets in three different places: the National Population Register at the Centre of Registers, conscript and reservist files at the Ministry of National Defence, and the Riflemen Union member roster. None of them carries a structured tag for civilian skills that the armed forces would need, and none can be queried as a single index in a crisis. By contrast, the Finnish vaestorekisteri logs every citizen of military age with skill data; the Israel Defense Forces have run a full-skills reservist registry since 1948, although the April 2026 Chatham House Super-Sparta report shows even that model strains under sustained mobilization.
Without action: In the first 48 hours of a crisis, units improvise. Surgeons end up driving trucks while hospitals search for surgeons. Cyber units cannot find the software engineers already cleared. Logistics commanders cannot route the welders and machinists that field repair depends on. The cost is measured in hours of delay at a moment when hours decide the campaign.
Lithuanian Context
Lithuania's small population (about 2.9 million) and concentrated digital infrastructure make a Finnish-style register technically achievable, but the same concentration makes the register a high-value target for cyber attack and information operations. Russia's defence ministry published a 21-target list on 15 April 2026 that already names Vilnius nodes; a centralized skills index would join that list. The legal frame is the General Data Protection Regulation and Article 8 of the EU Charter, both of which require a clear lawful basis, proportionality, and strong safeguards before any state may compile sensitive personal data at this scale.