Executive Summary
Ukraine showed civilian drone racers and flight-simulator gamers reach combat proficiency on first-person-view (FPV) drones in two to four weeks, against eight to twelve for novices. Lithuania has a recreational drone community registered under EU aviation rules (mandatory over 250 grams since 2021), plus the Riflemen Union (~17,000) and the Volunteer National Defence Force (KASP, 8,000 to 10,000). A reserve registry could compress mobilisation from months to weeks. The registry is itself a target. On 15 April 2026 the Russian Ministry of Defence published a 21-name European target list; a database of named drone operators is what foreign intelligence seeks, and it carries data-protection (GDPR) obligations. The recommended next step is a feasibility study by the Ministry of National Defence with the Riflemen Union, the Civil Aviation Authority, and the State Data Protection Inspectorate, drawing on the Estonian Cyber Unit and the Polish unit WOT-Drony. Whether the answer is a registry, an opt-in call-up under reserve law, or something else is for Lithuania to determine.
The Problem
Ukrainian frontline units integrated roughly 3,000 civilian FPV operators between 2022 and 2026 through Aerorozvidka and territorial-defence channels. A separate Ukrainian YAK-52 light-aircraft unit, crewed by civilian pilots on a six-to-eight-week training pipeline, is credited with more than 300 Shahed drone interceptions. The skill transfer is real: joystick control, video-feed piloting, and fast reactions move directly from racing and gaming into combat drone work.
Lithuania's exact civilian drone-pilot count is not public — the Civil Aviation Authority register exists under EASA rules but its numbers are not disclosed — and there is no standing mechanism to call drone hobbyists, FPV racers, or simulator gamers into a defence role on short notice. The Riflemen Union and KASP are the closest existing structures but neither has a drone-operator track equivalent to the Polish WOT-Drony or the Estonian Cyber Unit.
Without action: In a crisis, scaling drone-operator capacity from the standing force to wartime demand takes months instead of weeks. The skilled civilian pool stays unmobilised or self-organises outside any chain of command.
Lithuanian Context
Lithuania already has the institutional pieces — the Riflemen Union, KASP, the Civil Aviation Authority drone register, and Saulių Sajunga regional structures — and a Šakalienė amendments package (23 September 2025) that addresses airspace authorisation. Whether a drone-operator track sits inside the Riflemen Union, inside KASP, as a new Cyber-Unit-style auxiliary, or as an opt-in registry under defence-ministry control is a question of Lithuanian institutional design, not foreign template.