Executive Summary
Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia have no spy satellites; they rely on commercial providers and on what allies choose to share. Two recent events show the fragility. In June 2025 the US asked Vantor (formerly Maxar) to stop publishing imagery of the Iran war, and the company complied indefinitely (Times of Israel). On 20 April 2026 in Gdansk, France and Poland signed the first follow-up to the Treaty of Nancy, including a France-Poland mutual-security clause and a Polish military satellite-communications partnership with Airbus, Thales and Radmor; the Baltic states do not appear in the named partner list (Élysée joint declaration; EU Today). At the same time, Germany's December 2025 contract with Rheinmetall and ICEYE — €1.7 billion for the SPOCK 1 radar-satellite constellation, services through 2030, production from late 2026 — is explicitly named to protect the German-led Lithuania Brigade and the Suwałki Gap (SpaceNews; Rheinmetall press release, 18 December 2025). The capability is being built and aimed at Lithuania, paid for by Berlin. The recommendation is a two-track study, not a fixed procurement. A working group under the Ministry of National Defence, in trilateral format with Estonia and Latvia, should test two propositions in parallel. First: whether a sovereign-priority subscription on Germany's SPOCK 1 (estimated €15-25 million per nation per year, deliverable in around eighteen months) closes most of the gap at a fraction of a sovereign-build cost. Second: where remaining tasking gaps are operationally fatal — which would justify selectively layering national satellites, anchored on the Vilnius-based manufacturer NanoAvionics, a Kongsberg-owned firm already building a radar spy-satellite for European defence customers (Payload). A full sovereign 5-year programme is honestly costed at roughly €575 million total, around €192 million as Lithuania's one-third share — about three times the figure earlier circulated. Final scope, vendors and budget are decisions for the Seimas and the Ministry of National Defence.
Lithuanian Context
Lithuania's 2026 defence budget is €4.79 billion, 5.38% of GDP, with a weapons envelope of around €1.7 billion — a sovereign satellite programme at €192 million over five years would consume meaningful share, while a Phase 1 subscription bridge at €15-25 million per year would not. The Vilnius-based NanoAvionics gives Lithuania a real industrial anchor in space hardware, distinct from the munitions sector. The recommended next step is a Ministry of National Defence working group — trilateral with Estonia and Latvia — to test the subscription-bridge proposition against SPOCK 1 in parallel with a gap analysis on where sovereign assets are operationally indispensable. The choice between bridge-only, layered, or full-sovereign is for the Seimas and the Ministry to make.