Executive Summary
Lithuanian primes are producing at scale. Granta Autonomy reports several hundred FPV drones a month at the start of 2026 (dronelife.com). Brolis Defence builds gallium-antimonide mid-infrared sensors. Kongsberg-owned NanoAvionics builds satellite buses in Vilnius. Yet European money moves through frameworks Lithuania joined late or not at all: EDIRPA places 310 million euros across three 103.2 million euro calls and requires three-state consortia; the European Defence Fund commits 7.3 billion euros over the EU cycle; the NATO Drone Coalition (Latvia and UK co-led, ~20 signatories) ordered ~30,000 drones in 2025 against a 2.75 billion euro envelope. Lithuania has a Defence Industry Liaison inside the Ministry of National Defence and the industry association LDSIA (~100 members), but no equivalent of Estonia's investment-agency defence cell that co-engineered the 260 million euro Hanwha decision in 2025. The recommended next step is a Seimas-led feasibility study mapping which frameworks Lithuanian firms can reach, what dual-use friction blocks them under the Wassenaar Arrangement, and what shape the body should take.
The Problem
European defence procurement has consolidated around multinational frameworks. EDIRPA disburses 310 million euros across three 103.2 million euro calls and requires at least three member states per consortium. The European Defence Fund work programme totals 7.3 billion euros over the current EU budget cycle. The NATO Drone Coalition, co-led by Latvia and the United Kingdom with around 20 signatories, ordered roughly 30,000 drones in 2025 against a 2.75 billion euro envelope. The 150 billion euro SAFE regulation adopted in May 2025 is a loan envelope, not a grant; Lithuania's 6.3 billion euro share is debt the country must service.
Granta Autonomy, Brolis Defence, Brolis Semiconductors, NanoAvionics, Eltonas, Astera Industries, and RSI Europe each negotiate consortium entry and export licences alone. Macron's Île Longue announcement on 2 March 2026 listed nuclear-deterrence partners; the Baltics were absent from the list, not explicitly excluded. The Treaty of Nancy on 9 May 2025 set Polish-French bilateral defence cover; Lithuania is not a party. The Šakalienė amendments adopted on 23 September 2025 cover airspace only.
Without action: Lithuanian firms remain subscale, watch European money flow to consortia they cannot reach, and stay exposed without bilateral cover. The 15 April 2026 Russian Ministry of Defence target list named Vilnius among 21 sites; exporters of combat-relevant systems are already in the threat picture.
Lithuanian Context
Lithuania's industrial profile is narrow but high-value: FPV drones at scale (Granta), mid-infrared optoelectronics (Brolis), satellite buses (NanoAvionics), components and ammunition (Eltonas, Astera, RSI Europe). EDIRPA, EDF, NSPA, and the NATO Drone Coalition are designed for consortia and primes, not for a half-dozen specialists negotiating in parallel. Whether the answer is a stand-alone agency, an expanded Defence Industry Liaison, or a joint Baltic cell with Estonia and Latvia is a Lithuanian determination.