Executive Summary
Between 22 and 24 April 2026 Lithuania densified its air defence: the Cabinet approved 48 Merops interceptor drones (lrt.lt, militarnyi.com); Washington greenlit a $214M AIM-9X package (overtdefense.com); €234M of NASAMS deliveries went to the 1st Division (thedefensepost.com); APS of Poland was contracted to protect energy sites (unmannedairspace.info); and the German Panzerbrigade 45 will deploy Skyranger 30 short-range air-defence on Lithuanian soil (Janes IAV 2026). The Forward Area Air Defense Command and Control system (FAAD-C2, Northrop Grumman, $14.3M for the three Baltic states) ties these together. Defence Minister Šakalienė holds, since the Seimas amendments of 23 September 2025 (airspace only), authority to order military force against drones in restricted areas (militarnyi.com). What that stack lacks is a magazine deep enough for mass attack. Russia produced 4,186 strike-Shaheds in March 2026 and has staged single waves of 810 (ISIS-Online). At 200 interceptors per month, the deficit is 20.9 times. The 39-day Iran war confirmed the risk: PAC-3 stocks across the Gulf Cooperation Council were drawn down by roughly 86 percent, and the $4.76B Lockheed contract of 10 April 2026 to rebuild Patriot does not deliver until June 2030 (Bryen, weapons.substack.com; Fortune 24 April 2026). Lithuania cannot rely on US resupply during a Baltic crisis. The recommended next step is a joint Baltic working group, anchored on the Latvian-led Origin BLAZE / Estonian EIRSHIELD supply chain that achieved the first automated Baltic intercept in 2025 and is now deployed in Estonia, Latvia and Belgium (DroneLife 15 October 2025; Defense Post 9 February 2026), to study how Lithuania joins that chain and what magazine floor and production rate the Seimas should set. Specific platforms, vendors and unit counts remain determinations for the Ministry of Defence and the Seimas.
The Problem
Russia ran a March 2026 strike-Shahed tempo of 4,186 per month with single waves up to 810 (ISIS-Online, Alabuga production update; peak 7 September 2025). The Geran-3 jet variant cruises at 300-370 km/h and dives terminally at 600 km/h (militarnyi.com; defence-ua.com), not the 450+ km/h sustained that earlier drafts assumed. Gerbera decoys are layered two to three to one against strike Shaheds, and terrain-following profiles of 50 to 150 metres over Belarus fly below Lithuanian primary radar (Tatarigami_UA reporting). Vilnius is 35 km from the Belarusian border: a Shahed-136 reaches it in about 10.5 minutes, a Geran-3 cruise in 5.7, a Geran-3 terminal dive in 3.5.
Lithuania has procured the high end (NASAMS, AIM-9X, 48 Merops) and hosts the Bundeswehr Skyranger 30. What is missing is a low-cost kinetic tier that matches Russian volume. At a 1,000-interceptor fleet plus 200 per month in replenishment, with an 80 percent kill probability and 1.5 interceptors per kill, Lithuania can engage roughly 533 targets per wave and replace about 107 per month. A single 810-Shahed wave nearly empties the magazine; the production deficit against the Russian monthly tempo is 20.9 times. Collapse threshold is two to three sustained mass nights.
Without action: Without a low-cost tier, NASAMS and AIM-9X magazines are spent on Shahed and Gerbera decoy mass and the cruise and ballistic engagement rails are empty when the actual cruise or ballistic missile arrives. The Iran war showed this is not theoretical: PAC-3 stocks across the Gulf Cooperation Council were drawn down by roughly 86 percent in 39 days.
Lithuanian Context
Lithuania has bought the top of the air-defence stack. The gap is below it: the magazine depth needed to absorb mass volley attacks without exhausting the high-end interceptors reserved for cruise and ballistic threats. The political and legal predicate exists — the Šakalienė amendments of 23 September 2025 give the Defence Minister authority to order military force against drones in restricted airspace. The alliance picture is mixed: the Macron Île Longue meeting of 2 March 2026 named Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Sweden, Denmark and the United Kingdom (Northwood) as nuclear-deterrence partners, with the Baltics absent from the named list, not explicitly excluded. The Treaty of Nancy of 9 May 2025 between France and Poland, with Gdansk on 20 April 2026 as its first follow-up, is a bilateral track Lithuania is not party to. Lithuania's 2026 defence budget is €4.79B (5.38 percent of GDP), of which roughly €1.7B is the weapons envelope and €145M (about 25 percent of military procurement) is air defence against drones.