Press & Media

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

ARTICLE 89: LITHUANIA'S ONE-STRIKE CONSTITUTIONAL VACUUM — AND THE HYPERSONIC-ERA AUDIT EVERY GOVERNMENT NEEDS
When Capital-to-Capital Strike Times Drop Below Four Minutes, Constitutions That Bar Governments From the Chief-of-Command and Collective-Defence Roles Become Single Points of Failure

VILNIUS, Lithuania — April 27, 2026

The Baltic Defense Initiative (BDI) today publishes a constitutional analysis of Lithuania's depth-of-one presidential succession chain — and calls on every NATO ally with concentrated political leadership in hypersonic-strike range to conduct a similar continuity audit.

Article 89 of the Lithuanian Constitution has only four paragraphs. The first two designate the Speaker of the Seimas as the sole substitute if the President dies, resigns, is removed, falls ill, or is otherwise unable to serve. The third places two limits on the Speaker while acting as President: no early Seimas elections, and no minister appointments or dismissals without parliamentary agreement. The fourth is an absolute lockout: "The powers of the President of the Republic may not be executed in any other cases, or by any other persons or institutions."

The Prime Minister, the Government, and every other officeholder are constitutionally barred from exercising presidential powers. The constitutional succession chain has a depth of one.

THE GEOMETRY

Vilnius sits 35 km from the Belarusian border and 306 km from Kaliningrad. The Presidential Palace and the Seimas chamber stand less than two kilometres apart in central Vilnius — within the impact envelope of a single coordinated salvo. From Kaliningrad, a Russian Iskander-M ballistic missile reaches the capital in 102–146 seconds; from Belarus, an Iskander-K cruise missile in 130–175 seconds; a Kinzhal hypersonic in under four minutes.

WHAT HAPPENS AT MINUTE THREE

A coordinated salvo that incapacitates the President and the Speaker simultaneously would leave Lithuania facing serious ambiguity over which institution can authoritatively exercise presidential powers — including the chief-of-command role under Article 84, the constitutional emergency regimes under Articles 142–144 (each of which requires a presidential proposal), and the constitutionally clearest pathway for collective-defence requests to NATO under Articles 4 and 5 of the Washington Treaty. Lithuanian defence law and the Government's own constitutional powers in foreign relations and security provide partial continuity channels — armed defence begins from the moment of aggression, and pre-prepared command plans take effect if no presidential decision is received — but the absence of a clearly designated successor beyond the Speaker leaves a gap that has not been formally examined.

A $50–80M missile package could produce serious constitutional ambiguity at the moment of greatest crisis. Russian information operations could exploit that ambiguity to seed stabilization offers via Russian-aligned figures presented as legitimate authorities, even as the Constitution itself declares any such seizure of state institutions unlawful and invalid.

THIS IS NOT ONLY A LITHUANIAN PROBLEM

The Lithuanian case is the most extreme — less than two kilometres between the only two authorised offices, 102 seconds of warning, an absolute paragraph-4 lockout — but the underlying issue is general. Most NATO constitutions were drafted decades before sub-four-minute capital-to-capital strike times became routine. The constitutional question they were never asked is the one that now matters most:

If the head of state and the constitutionally designated successor are eliminated in the same strike, can the Government — the standing cabinet, with an authenticated Prime Minister and an intact ministerial chain — assume the chief-of-command role and the authority to invoke collective defence?

Where the answer is no, or where the answer is unclear, the constitution itself is a single point of failure. Adversary planning treats fixed, public succession rules as inputs. A constitution that bars the cabinet from acting after decapitation tells an adversary exactly how many people they need to remove.

The principle BDI proposes is straightforward and country-agnostic: no constitution should bar the standing government from filling the chief-of-command role and the collective-defence-invocation role after a decapitation event. Every NATO ally with leadership concentrated in hypersonic-strike range — which is most of them — should run the audit.

THE FRAMERS' BLIND SPOT

The 1992 Lithuanian Constitution was drafted eighteen months after the Vilnius January 1991 events. The framers' fear was authoritarian recapture from the inside, not military decapitation from the air. The Article 89 lockout reflects that era and has never been stress-tested against Iskander-class transit times. The same is true of most post-Cold-War constitutions written when "decapitation strike" still meant a special-forces raid, not a 102-second hypersonic transit.

WHAT BDI PROPOSES

For Lithuania: a cross-party constitutional commission, with Venice Commission input, mandated to design a succession architecture that survives a single-strike scenario, and to specify how Articles 142, 143 and 144 apply when the last surviving executive is a civilian (per Article 140 and the Constitutional Court ruling of 31 March 2004). BDI does not prescribe which articles to amend, how far to extend the chain, or what limits to place on an Acting President's authority. Those are determinations for Lithuanian constitutional scholars and the Seimas.

For NATO allies more broadly: a hypersonic-era constitutional continuity audit, conducted under each member's own constitutional review machinery, focused on three questions:

1. Does the succession chain have a depth greater than one for the chief-of-command role?

2. Is the standing government — the cabinet, with an authenticated Prime Minister — empowered, by the constitution itself, to assume the chief-of-command role after decapitation, or is it barred?

3. Does the authority to invoke NATO Article 5 and Article 4 survive the loss of the head of state, or does it disappear with that office?

Where any of those answers is no, the constitution is a publicly documented vulnerability that adversary planning can exploit at sub-four-minute notice.

ABOUT BDI

The Baltic Defense Initiative is an independent, nonpartisan research organization based in Vilnius, proposing a fundamental shift in Lithuanian defense strategy modelled on France's post-WWII commitment to sovereign deterrence. Founded by Dr. Thiébaut Devergranne, former legal counsel at France's SGDSN (Prime Minister's defense and national security apparatus). All research is evidence-based, drawing from primary constitutional texts, Constitutional Court rulings, NATO procedural records, and battlefield-validated systems.

CONTACT

Dr. Thiébaut Devergranne
Founder, Baltic Defense Initiative
https://balticdefenseinitiative.com/contact

Press release page: https://balticdefenseinitiative.com/press
Full constitutional analysis: https://balticdefenseinitiative.com/initiatives/constitutional-continuity-of-government

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

BALTIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE LAUNCHES COMPREHENSIVE DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR LITHUANIA
Independent Research Proposes French-Style Deterrence Model for Baltic Security

VILNIUS, Lithuania — February 3, 2026

The Baltic Defense Initiative (BDI) today publicly launched a comprehensive defense research platform proposing a fundamental shift in Lithuanian defense strategy — one modeled on France's post-WWII commitment to sovereign deterrence.

THE PROPOSAL

Lithuania's current defense posture relies heavily on NATO collective defense, with limited autonomous capability. BDI proposes a paradigm shift: investing in autonomous defense capabilities at the same proportion of GDP that France committed to its nuclear deterrence program — using modern technologies like AI, autonomous systems, and drone warfare instead of nuclear weapons.

"After three devastating wars with Germany, France committed to ensuring its sovereignty would never be questioned again," said Dr. Thiébaut Devergranne, BDI founder and former legal counsel at France's Prime Minister defense apparatus (SGDSN). "Lithuania faces a similar strategic imperative. The difference is that today's technology — drones, autonomous systems, AI — makes meaningful deterrence achievable for a nation of 2.8 million people."

11 CONCRETE INITIATIVES

1. DETER RUSSIA WITH MUTUALLY ASSURED DESTRUCTION DOCTRINE
Apply France's Cold War nuclear deterrence doctrine to conventional weapons. Develop 500,000+ autonomous strike platforms and 9,000 guided missiles ensuring any aggressor would suffer devastating consequences. €6.4B over 5 years (1.8% of GDP) — same as France's nuclear investment.

2. MAKE OCCUPATION UNBEARABLE (TRAIN 8,000 SNIPERS)
Build a force of 8,000 precision shooters across military and civilian reserves. Ukraine's "Ghosts of Bakhmut" achieved 558 confirmed kills with a 20-person team. Finland embeds snipers in every company. €63-87M investment — less than two air defense batteries.

3. NEGOTIATE FRANCE'S NUCLEAR UMBRELLA
Seven European nations have expressed interest in hosting French nuclear forces as insurance against American withdrawal. France is the only EU nuclear power with complete autonomy. Macron explicitly offered extended deterrence discussions to EU partners.

4. CONSCRIPT EVERYONE (BUILD 300,000 TRAINED RESERVES)
Lithuania conscripts only 3,500 people per year — grossly inadequate for a country 35km from a hostile border. Finland has 900,000 trained reserves from 5.5 million people. Target: 25,000-30,000 conscripts/year, building 300,000+ reserves.

5. BUILD THE TECH TO INTERCEPT ATTACK DRONES AT 1/1000TH THE COST
Deploy autonomous drone swarms to intercept Shahed attacks at €3,000-5,000 per kill versus €4 million for Patriot. Ukraine's Wild Hornets achieve 68-90% success rates. By July 2025, 9 out of 10 Ukrainian Shahed kills came from interceptor drones.

6. BUY WEAPONS IN 7 DAYS, NOT 18 MONTHS
Reform procurement to enable 7-day contracting. Ukraine's DOT-Chain delivers weapons in 10 days average; traditional NATO procurement takes 18-24 months. In high-intensity conflict, equipment that arrives late is equipment that doesn't matter.

7. MASS-PRODUCE €350 KAMIKAZE DRONES
Mass-produce kamikaze drones at scale Ukraine has proven in combat — 10,000 units monthly at €350 per drone. Ukraine produced 4 million drones in 2025. €350 per FPV drone vs €4-10M per destroyed tank.

8. MOBILIZE 1.3 MILLION DIASPORA FOR DEFENSE
Lithuania has 1.3 million citizens abroad — nearly a third of the nation. Ukraine's United24 raised $1.4B from diaspora. Lithuania's diaspora represents €100M+ annual fundraising potential, 15,000+ defense-relevant professionals, and advocacy networks in 30+ NATO capitals.

9. DEPLOY ACOUSTIC SENSOR NETWORKS
When Russian electronic warfare jams counter-battery radar, acoustic sensors continue operating. Sound cannot be jammed. Deploy 150 acoustic sensor stations achieving 10km artillery localization and passive drone detection immune to electronic warfare.

10. ESTABLISH NATIONAL DEFENSE INSTITUTE (IHEDN MODEL)
France's IHEDN has educated 100,000+ civilian leaders on defense over 90 years. Establish a similar institute educating 150+ senior civilian leaders annually on national defense — creating a defense-literate elite across business, government, and media.

11. LAUNCH BALTIC SPY SATELLITES
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania jointly launch 6 reconnaissance satellites — ending dependence on 3-5 day NATO imagery sharing delays. €150-200M total, split three ways (~€50-70M per nation). Sovereign satellites deliver in under 2 hours.

KEY FINDINGS

• Current Gap: Lithuania's defense is overly reliant on external help with no viable Plan B
• The Model: France's deterrence investment (as % of GDP) applied to modern autonomous systems
• The Goal: Guarantee unbearable costs to any aggressor — securing sovereignty through strength, not dependency
• The Research: 200 defense initiatives covering drones, naval systems, air defense, strike capabilities, and more

WHY NOW

Recent advances have fundamentally transformed what small nations can achieve:
• FPV drones costing €500 can destroy vehicles worth €1M+
• Ukraine has demonstrated that mass-produced simple systems can counter conventional military advantages
• AI and autonomous systems enable force multiplication previously impossible for small nations

ABOUT THE FOUNDER

Dr. Thiébaut Devergranne served six years within the French Prime Minister's defense apparatus (SGDSN) as legal counsel on national security matters, participating in G7/G8 negotiations. Having lived in Lithuania for over a decade, he witnessed the gap between France's defense structure and Lithuania's current posture.

ABOUT BDI

The Baltic Defense Initiative is an independent, nonpartisan research organization based in Vilnius. All research is evidence-based, drawing from battlefield-proven systems and strategies. BDI is not affiliated with any government, political party, or defense contractor.

CONTACT

Dr. Thiébaut Devergranne
Founder, Baltic Defense Initiative
https://balticdefenseinitiative.com/contact

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