A New Deterrence Strategy for Lithuania
Our 13 strategic defense initiatives guarantee unbearable costs to any aggressor and ensure Lithuania's full independence and sovereignty through strength. Not dependency.
Strategy
4 initiativesMutually Assured Destruction - implementation of the French Gaullist Model to Lithuania
Transpose French nuclear doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction to conventional weapons, building a national arsenal that guarantees unbearable retaliatory costs for any aggressor.
This initiative adapts the logic of nuclear Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) to conventional precision-strike capabilities, following the 'Gaullist model' established by France's Force de Frappe program. The foundational premise—that aggression is deterred when retaliation is certain, survivable, and catastrophic—remains valid independent of nuclear weapons. The initiative aims for Lithuania to establish a Conventional MAD (C-MAD) framework: an indigenous arsenal of +500,000 autonomous strike platforms and 9,000 guided missiles capable of imposing strategic-level damage on adversary infrastructure, supported by domestically-controlled production facilities ensuring indefinite sustainment.
French Nuclear Weapons Hosting and Permanent Forces Agreement
Negotiate agreement with France to extend nuclear deterrence to Lithuania under the emerging European nuclear umbrella framework established by the Northwood Declaration
The strategic landscape for European nuclear deterrence transformed in 2025. The Northwood Declaration (July 2025) established unprecedented UK-France nuclear coordination, creating a framework that is now expanding rapidly. In May 2025, President Macron stated he is 'open to discussions about deploying French nuclear weapons to European countries that request them'—his clearest signal yet. Seven European nations have now expressed openness: Sweden (in active negotiations), Poland (pursuing most aggressively), Germany (64% public support, Chancellor Merz calling for talks), Lithuania (President Nausėda supportive), Denmark (PM Frederiksen: 'Everything has to be on the table'), Latvia, and Finland. Lithuanian President Nausėda told Macron directly that Lithuania wanted coverage under France's nuclear umbrella. Defence Minister Šakalienė stated Lithuania would consider 'realistic plans for deployment of nuclear weapons or their components' even if requiring constitutional amendment. A Nordic-Baltic-Poland regional bloc is emerging as potential framework for collective engagement with France. This initiative pursues Lithuanian participation in the emerging European nuclear deterrence architecture through the Northwood Declaration framework, positioning Lithuania alongside Sweden and Poland in what Europeans frame as a 'second insurance policy' complementing US extended deterrence.
Lithuanian Border Defense Line
Construct a national fortification system encompassing all 1,650 km of Lithuanian borders with three-echelon defense architecture, smart mine warfare integration, and drone-optimized strongpoints—creating the most fortified nation in Europe.
The Lithuanian Defense Line is the most comprehensive fortification project in modern European history—a national undertaking creating multi-echeloned defense across all 1,650 km of land borders. The system integrates tactical lessons from Ukraine's Surovikin and Zaluzhny Lines with the historical precedent of Finland's Salpa Line to establish permanent infrastructure of resistance that multiplies defensive combat power by up to 10x. Three echelons provide depth: First Echelon (0-5 km) halts vanguards with anti-tank ditches engineered to immobilize 60-ton MBTs, dragon's teeth with high-tension cable connections, and mine belts enabled by Lithuania's December 2025 Ottawa Convention withdrawal. Second Echelon (5-20 km) enables maneuver defense with pre-chambered bridge demolitions and Spike-equipped strongpoints. Third Echelon (20-50 km) protects strategic depth with urban fortress zones and prepared abatis. The fortification network is optimized for the 2026 drone-dominated battlefield: 35 m² modular bunkers withstanding 152mm direct hits, integrated acoustic drone detection, and fiber-optic communications immune to RF jamming. Domestic mine production via Ostaralab (€500M program) ensures sovereign capability. Funded through Lithuania's 5-6% GDP defense commitment and EU SAFE allocation (€6.375B eligible), construction leverages 500+ excavators and 20,000 workers to create a 'death zone' that ensures any armored offensive faces catastrophic attrition before reaching strategic objectives.
Total National Mobilization Doctrine
Transform Lithuania into an 'indigestible society' through universal conscription, six-pillar Total Defense, and deterrence by resilience.
Lithuania's current selective conscription (~3,500/year) is inadequate for a nation facing existential threat 35km from its capital. This initiative implements universal mandatory military service combined with a comprehensive six-pillar Total Defense framework: (1) Military Defense—300,000+ trained reserves through universal conscription; (2) Civil Defense—population trained in survival, first aid, resistance; (3) Economic Defense—Swiss-model mandatory stockpiling, supply chain resilience; (4) Psychological Defense—cognitive security against disinformation using Swedish DIDI model; (5) Digital Defense—decentralized mesh communications (LoRa/Meshtastic), civilian intelligence apps; (6) Social Defense—community cohesion, resistance organization in every municipality. The strategic concept is 'deterrence by resilience': when an adversary realizes that capturing territory results only in prolonged, technologically sophisticated insurgency, the utility of invasion is neutralized. Drawing on Finland's 900,000 reserves, Singapore's six pillars, Switzerland's economic mandates, and Ukraine's digital resistance, Lithuania becomes not a target but an armed nation where occupation means facing endless, coordinated resistance.
Strike
3 initiativesCounter-Satellite Capability Development for Russian Orbital Denial
Develop multi-domain counter-satellite capabilities to deny Russian space-based PNT, ISR, communications, and early warning during crisis or conflict
Russian military operations are critically dependent on space-based assets: GLONASS provides precision navigation for Iskander-M and cruise missiles; the Liana network (Lotos-S ELINT, Pion-NKS radar) enables maritime targeting; EKS/Kupol provides strategic missile warning; and military SATCOM networks (Blagovest, Meridian-M, emerging Rassvet) enable command and control across the vast Russian theater. As of 2026, Russia maintains approximately 100+ military satellites across these constellations, with critical vulnerabilities in the EKS early warning system (potentially only 1-4 of 6 Tundra satellites operational) and delays in the Rassvet LEO constellation (only 6 of planned 900 satellites deployed). This initiative develops Lithuanian contributions to NATO counter-space capabilities across four domains: (1) Electronic warfare/jamming against GLONASS and SATCOM downlinks; (2) Cyber operations against ground control segments (Titov Centre, Vostochny integration); (3) Directed energy systems for satellite sensor degradation; (4) Kinetic ASAT contribution through NATO pooling. Lithuania's niche contribution focuses on ground-based electronic denial and cyber access to Russian space ground infrastructure, leveraging proximity to Kaliningrad and existing SIGINT/cyber capabilities. The strategic rationale is asymmetric deterrence: degrading Russian space capabilities eliminates precision strike guidance, blinds ISR enabling force maneuver, and disrupts C2 synchronization—all without requiring territorial defense of the space domain itself. A small investment in counter-space creates disproportionate impact on adversary military effectiveness.
Strategic Deep Strike Drone Capability (1000km+)
Develop strategic strike drones capable of reaching targets 1000+ km deep in adversary territory
Strategic deep strike drones with 1000km+ range provide Lithuania the capability to reach targets deep within adversary territory, eliminating the sanctuary of distance. Ukraine has demonstrated that long-range drone strikes on Russian refineries, airfields, and military facilities can impose significant strategic costs—economically through infrastructure damage and militarily through forcing defensive resource reallocation. This initiative develops or acquires long-endurance strike drones capable of reaching strategic targets 1000-1500km from Lithuanian territory. At €30,000-60,000 per unit, these drones provide cost-effective deep strike capability that can target military-industrial facilities, logistics infrastructure, and strategic military assets. Mass production of 50+ units monthly enables sustained pressure campaigns. For Lithuania, strategic deep strike creates genuine deterrence by ensuring any aggressor faces consequences across their territory. This fundamentally changes the risk calculation for potential adversaries who can no longer assume their strategic depth provides protection.
Low-Cost Loitering Munition Mass Production
Establish domestic production of low-cost loitering munitions for mass deployment against high-value targets
Mass production of low-cost loitering munitions provides Lithuania with the most cost-effective means to engage high-value enemy targets at scale. Ukraine's experience demonstrates that expendable precision drones, produced in thousands monthly, can overwhelm air defenses, destroy armored vehicles, damage critical infrastructure, and force adversaries to relocate strategic assets—all while maintaining favorable cost-exchange ratios. This initiative establishes domestic production capacity for 500+ loitering munitions per month, with variants optimized for anti-armor, anti-infrastructure, and maritime targets. At €10,000-20,000 per unit, these systems can destroy targets worth millions of euros, enabling sustainable attrition warfare that exhausts enemy resources. The modular design allows rapid development of new variants based on operational feedback. For Lithuania, national production capability eliminates dependency on foreign suppliers during conflict, ensures supply continuity, and creates export opportunities with NATO allies. The 200-500km range covers all Baltic operational requirements, while integration with NATO targeting systems enables coalition operations.
Drones
2 initiativesAutonomous Counter-Drone Interceptor Swarm System
Deploy autonomous interceptor drone swarms to counter mass OWA-UAV attacks at cost parity, bridging the 'attrition trap' that renders traditional GBAD economically unsustainable
The proliferation of low-cost one-way attack drones (OWA-UAV) has inverted traditional air defense economics. A Shahed-136 costs $20,000-50,000 while interceptors range from $480,000 (Stinger) to $4,000,000 (Patriot PAC-3)—creating an 'economic kill chain' where defenders are exhausted before attacker arsenals deplete. Mass attacks of 100-200 drones daily (peaks exceeding 800) create a 'magazine depth crisis' for traditional batteries carrying only 4-16 missiles. This initiative establishes autonomous interceptor swarms targeting unit costs of 3,000-5,000 EUR—achieving cost parity with threats. High-speed platforms (350+ km/h electric, 450 km/h turbojet) carry AI targeting computers (YOLOv8 on Jetson Xavier, 8ms inference) with EO/IR sensor fusion for autonomous terminal engagement. Kinetic neutralization at 10,400+ Joules destroys Class I/II drones without explosives. Swarm coordination via Consensus-Based Bundle Algorithm (CBBA) enables decentralized target allocation resilient to jamming. Ukrainian combat experience validates this approach. Russian countermeasures (rear-facing sensors, evasive maneuvering, PTM-3 mine drops) confirm interceptor effectiveness. For Lithuania, integration with the European 'Drone Wall' initiative (projected €1B for Baltic/Poland coverage) provides layered defense of Klaipėda LNG, Vilnius grid, and interconnection infrastructure against sustained mass attacks from Kaliningrad/Belarus vectors.
Defensive Drone Interceptor Fleet
Deploy autonomous interceptor drone fleet achieving 1:12 to 1:60 cost-exchange ratio against Shahed-type threats, providing the 'democratization of air defense' that transforms billion-dollar state programs into agile, tech-forward units
The proliferation of one-way attack (OWA) UAS—Shahed-136/Geran-2 at $20-50K per unit—has fundamentally altered territorial defense calculus. Traditional SAMs create 'economic kill' scenarios: a $1.2M AMRAAM against a $30K drone represents $1.1M value loss per engagement. In sustained conflict, defenders deplete finite high-value interceptors on low-value targets, leaving airspace open to cruise missiles and manned aviation. This initiative establishes a Defensive Drone Interceptor Fleet achieving near 1:1 or better cost-exchange ratios. Ukrainian operational proof validates the concept: the Dronefall project achieved 10,000+ confirmed interceptions by late 2025, accounting for 12% of all Shaheds launched in October 2025. Wild Hornets 'Sting' interceptors (315+ km/h) achieve 60-90% success rates; a single operator destroyed 24 drones in one night. Cost ratios: Merops at 1:2, Sting at 1:12-14, modified FPV at 1:30-60. Critical enabler: AI terminal guidance. The TFL Anti-Shahed module ($300) provides autonomous target lock at closing speeds exceeding 100 m/s where human latency fails. This 'human-in-the-loop, AI-on-the-target' approach handles mass swarms while providing EW resilience—onboard processing continues mission even in GPS-denied environments. For Lithuania—679km Belarus border, Vilnius 35km from border—the interceptor fleet provides strategic depth. September 2025 Seimas amendments authorize instant reaction against drone threats. Domestic industry (Granta X-Wing, NT Service SkyWiper) provides sovereign capability. Integration with NATO SAPIENT protocol and FAAD C2 ensures interoperability. This is the 'democratization of air defense'—a strategic necessity for small nations facing autonomous attrition warfare.
Intelligence
2 initiativesBaltic Spy Satellites
Establish joint Estonian-Latvian-Lithuanian to build and operate a spy satellite constellation (3 SAR, 3 optical) providing 25cm resolution and 4-hour revisit for sovereign Baltic ISR capability
Baltic Spy Satellites a trilateral Estonia-Latvia-Lithuania program establishing sovereign space-based ISR capability independent of allied sharing. Constellation of 6 satellites—3 SAR (all-weather, day/night, 25cm resolution) and 3 optical (sub-meter visible spectrum)—provides persistent coverage of Kaliningrad, Belarus border, and Western Military District with 4-hour average revisit time. Program follows Finland/ICEYE model (€158M for 3 SAR satellites) and Ukraine-Czechia Suziria model (joint development). Total investment €150-200M shared across three nations (~€50-70M each). Leverages Lithuanian laser expertise, Estonian space entrepreneurship, and Latvian communications capabilities. Includes distributed ground station network across all three nations for resilience. Integrates with NATO space architecture and EU IRIS² program. Sovereign tasking authority ensures priority access during crisis without dependency on commercial providers or allied sharing latency.
Offensive Cyber Operations Capability Development
Develop offensive cyber operations capability for asymmetric deterrence and strategic effect against adversary command, logistics, and infrastructure systems
For a small state like Lithuania, facing a significantly larger adversary at the geostrategic crossroads of the Suwałki Gap, Offensive Cyber Operations (OCO) capability is not merely a technical enhancement but a strategic necessity. OCO provides asymmetric deterrence by enabling cost imposition in the digital domain—disrupting adversary command and control, logistics systems, and critical infrastructure without requiring military mass or geographic advantage. The evidence is combat-proven: Ukrainian cyber operations and the Belarusian Cyber Partisans' 'Railway War' demonstrate that well-prepared cyber capabilities can halt armored columns, blind intelligence networks, and isolate strategic positions. In January 2022, approximately 30 Cyber Partisans delayed Russian troop transit through Belarus by two weeks at a critical invasion juncture—buying precious time for Kyiv's defense. This initiative builds a dedicated 50-100 operator OCO unit following the 'Defend Forward' doctrine—establishing persistent presence in adversary systems during peacetime to ensure disruption options are available the moment crisis escalates. Integration with SIGINT and NATO's SCEPVA framework enables Lithuania to become a 'security provider' contributing niche regional capabilities to collective defense. The €35-60 million four-year investment provides capability multiplication that imposes unacceptable costs on any adversary contemplating aggression in the Baltics.
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