Executive Summary
On 2 March 2026, French President Emmanuel Macron used a speech at the Île Longue submarine base to set out a doctrine of forward deterrence and to name seven partner countries for nuclear-capable bomber exercises: Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Sweden, and Denmark (Élysée; CSIS, Atlantic Council, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, ECFR, Egmont, March 2026). Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Norway, and Finland are not on the list. The speech did not refuse the Baltic states; it simply did not include them. Major analysts read the absence as de-facto exclusion for now. The offer covers temporary aircraft deployments and exercises, with partners contributing intelligence, early-warning, and air defence — not permanent basing or warhead storage. France then went bilateral with Poland at the Tusk-Macron Gdansk meeting of 20 April 2026, the first follow-up to the Treaty of Nancy of 9 May 2025; the Baltics got no parallel bilateral. The Northwood Declaration of 10 July 2025 is a UK-France bilateral with no accession clause (gov.uk; IISS September 2025). Lithuania still has reason to diversify away from sole reliance on US extended deterrence: the Iran war of 28 February to 8 April 2026 (39 days) saw roughly 1,471 Iranian ballistic missiles fired and left Gulf-allied PAC-3 stocks about 86 percent depleted, with MBDA only doubling Aster output through 2026. The recommended next step is a study by the Seimas, the Foreign Ministry, and Defence Ministry — coordinated with Polish counterparts — mapping options in three honest tiers: a declaratory political signal, a conventional Rafale rotation similar to Sweden in April 2025, and any longer-term nuclear-capable exercise inclusion. Whether to amend Article 137, what to ask Paris for at each tier, and how to hedge against the roughly 30-40 percent chance a Rassemblement National presidency in April 2027 reverses the doctrine are decisions for Lithuanian constitutional scholars, the Seimas, and the executive.
The Problem
Vilnius lies 290 km from Kaliningrad, inside the 500 km range of the Russian Iskander-M ballistic missile. Russia keeps an estimated 1,500 non-strategic nuclear warheads (Federation of American Scientists; Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 2025). Belarus has hosted Russian tactical nuclear weapons since 2023, with President Lukashenko confirming Oreshnik intermediate-range missiles in September and December 2025. The 2024 update of Russian nuclear doctrine lowered the threshold for first use. The Iran war of 28 February to 8 April 2026 — 39 days, around 5.6 weeks — showed live that Western high-end interceptor stocks cannot be sustained at peer-conflict tempo: Iran fired roughly 1,471 ballistic missiles, Gulf-allied PAC-3 inventories ended the war about 86 percent depleted, and MBDA is only doubling Aster output through 2026. Sole reliance on US extended deterrence is therefore a structurally weaker bet today than it was a year ago.
Lithuania is not on the partner list Macron named at Île Longue on 2 March 2026 (Germany, Poland, Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Sweden, Denmark). It is absent from the list, not explicitly refused — but the offer as it stands does not cover Lithuania. France went bilateral with Poland at Gdansk on 20 April 2026, the first follow-up to the 9 May 2025 Treaty of Nancy; no parallel Lithuanian bilateral exists. The Northwood Declaration of 10 July 2025 is bilateral UK-France with no accession mechanism in the founding text (gov.uk; IISS September 2025). Article 137 of the Lithuanian Constitution prohibits weapons of mass destruction on Lithuanian territory; the supremacy clause requires a two-thirds vote — 94 of 141 Seimas members — with two readings at least three months apart. The current coalition, around 80 seats, is short of that bar. The executive branch is split: President Nausėda calls Macron's offer 'an interesting idea' (LRT, March 2025); Defence Minister Šakalienė notes a constitutional amendment may be needed and that 'Lithuania does not have any concrete proposals from allies' (LRT, March 2025); Prime Minister Paluckas has called France's ability to extend a European nuclear umbrella 'weak' and said the United States 'will not abandon its nuclear umbrella over Europe' (LRT, April 2025).
Without action: Without a structured engagement, Lithuania risks being locked out as the Polish bilateral track and the named-seven framework harden into established practice; carrying the cost of an Article 137 debate during a future crisis instead of in a calm pre-2027 window; and continuing to rely on US interceptor inventory that the Iran war showed cannot be replenished at the tempo a Baltic conflict would demand.
Lithuanian Context
Lithuania occupies NATO's most exposed position. Vilnius is 35 km from Belarus and 290 km from Kaliningrad, inside Iskander-M range. Russia's non-strategic nuclear stockpile is around 1,500 warheads, against a French force of roughly 290 — the minimum credible deterrent for France itself, not a warfighting addition that scales to an eighth client. French extended deterrence to Lithuania, in any tier, is therefore a political and symbolic commitment, which is the operational essence of extended deterrence and should not be over-promised as battlefield mass. The Iran war is the operative reason to pursue it anyway: the United States cannot resupply Patriot at peer-conflict tempo, so a second declaratory anchor is worth having even at a modest expected payoff. The Lithuanian executive is internally divided — presidential interest, ministerial caution, prime-ministerial public scepticism — which means the lowest-commitment declaratory ask is the only step achievable under the current government without first reopening the question internally.