Three days into the US-Israel military campaign against Iran, the war is already rewriting assumptions about modern conflict — assumptions that matter deeply for Lithuania's defense.
The Situation: Day 3
On approximately February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched a coordinated large-scale military assault against Iran. This follows a previous "12-Day War" in mid-2025 where Israel achieved air superiority but failed to permanently degrade Iranian capabilities.
By Day 3, the war is developing very differently from coalition expectations:
- Iran has been relentlessly attacking American bases across Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE, and Qatar — launching hundreds of missiles daily against both military and civilian infrastructure.
- Two high-value coalition radar systems destroyed — the FPS-132 in Qatar and a Radome radar in Bahrain, confirmed by Qatar's defense minister.
- Patriot systems failing on camera — PAC-2 interceptors filmed missing maneuvering Iranian ballistic missiles.
- GPS heavily jammed in the Strait of Hormuz, degrading JDAMs, cruise missiles, and drone navigation.
- US withdrew all equipment and personnel from the UAE — a major repositioning signal.
- Iran's command structure intact — decentralized after the 12-Day War, it has maintained coherent operations for 60+ hours under sustained strikes.
The coalition expected to suppress Iranian capabilities within days. That has not happened. Iran, fighting for regime survival, prepared thoroughly: decentralizing its command structures, adopting innovative missile launch tactics, and reforming its air defense architecture.
Lesson 1: The Interceptor Math Is Broken
This is the single most important lesson of the war.
Coalition interceptor stocks, planned to last 15–20 days, may now be depleted in just 10 days given the intensity of Iranian fire. US missile stocks were already at just 25% of Pentagon-required levels before the war began. Patriot interceptor production was ~600/year, being tripled to 2,000/year — but that takes years to materialize.
What this means for Lithuania: Each NASAMS battery carries a limited interceptor loadout. In a sustained Russian missile and drone campaign against the Baltics — and Russia possesses a missile arsenal that dwarfs Iran's — Lithuania's interceptors could be exhausted in days, not weeks.
The implications are stark:
- Stockpile depth matters more than battery count. Buying 2 NASAMS batteries with 50 interceptors each is less valuable than 1 battery with 200 interceptors.
- Layered defense is mandatory. Expensive interceptors must not be wasted on cheap drones. Gun-based CIWS and directed energy must handle low-end threats.
- European interceptor production capacity must be treated as a national security priority, not an afterthought.
Lesson 2: GPS Denial Is Real and Devastating
Iran is jamming GPS across the Strait of Hormuz, severely compromising the precision of coalition guided munitions like JDAMs, cruise missiles, and drone navigation.
For the Baltics, multiply this by 10. Russia operates the world's most advanced electronic warfare arsenal:
- Krasukha-4 — radar and communications jamming
- Murmansk-BN — HF communications jamming at 5,000km range
- Pole-21 — GPS denial over hundreds of kilometers
- Shipborne and airborne jammers already operational in Kaliningrad, 35km from the Lithuanian border
If Iran can degrade Western precision munitions in a single chokepoint, Russia can deny GPS across the entire Baltic theatre from Day 1. Lithuania must assume:
- All GPS-dependent precision munitions will be degraded
- Drone navigation relying on GPS will fail
- Communications will be intermittent at best
Recommendation: Procure munitions with INS/terrain-matching backup. Train all units for GPS-denied navigation. Invest in anti-jam GPS receivers for critical platforms. Develop EW-resistant drone navigation using visual SLAM and inertial systems.
Lesson 3: Decentralization Is Survival
Iran reformed its military architecture after the 12-Day War. The changes are well documented:
- Autonomous launchers: The Bavar-373-II now integrates AESA radar into each launcher, eliminating the vulnerable central radar node. Each unit operates independently.
- Shoot-and-scoot: Iran claims repositioning in under 4 minutes — faster than any comparable long-range air defense system worldwide.
- Drone-based surveillance: Mohajer-10 and Karrar drones serve as "flying radars," transmitting data via satellite. Ground radars stay off until the moment of engagement, reducing vulnerability to SEAD/DEAD.
- Wireless datalinks: Physical cables replaced with encrypted wireless connections, built with Chinese assistance.
The result: despite three days of intense coalition strikes aimed at decapitation, Iran's command structure has survived with its operational tempo intact.
Lithuanian parallel: Every lesson here applies directly:
| Iranian Reform | Lithuanian Need |
|---|---|
| Autonomous launchers with integrated radar | Each unit must be self-sufficient |
| Wireless datalinks replacing cables | Redundant comms — mesh, HF, satellite |
| 4-minute shoot-and-scoot | Mobile everything — no fixed positions after H-hour |
| Drones as passive surveillance | UAV-centric ISR to protect radars |
| Decentralized command | Distributed HQs, deep succession planning |
| Tunnel and civilian structure dispersal | Lithuania's forests and urban terrain |
Iran's survival proves that a smaller power can resist a technologically superior enemy — if it plans for resilience, not just strength.
Lesson 4: Air Defense Mobility Is Existential
A static air defense battery is a dead air defense battery.
Iran learned this in the 12-Day War, when Israeli strikes primarily targeted radars to neutralize defenses. The Bavar-373-II's post-war reform focused entirely on mobility and autonomy:
- Each launcher now carries its own AESA radar
- Repositioning in under 4 minutes with logistics for remote reloads
- Units emerge from tunnels and civilian structures only after drone alerts confirm threats
For Lithuania: Fixed NASAMS or Patriot positions will be identified by Russian satellite reconnaissance (including Chinese satellite imagery — already shared with Iran) and destroyed by Iskander strikes within hours. Lithuania's air defense procurement must prioritize shoot-and-scoot capability with autonomous launcher operation.
Lesson 5: The "Mosquito Fleet" Against Superior Navies
Iran retains more than 30 ships, 6 modern well-armed catamarans, plus more than 1,500 fast attack boats, of which at least 300 are equipped with missiles. The coalition has confirmed only 4 Iranian naval kills, 3 of which were 1960s-era ships probably already abandoned.
The Iranian submarine fleet remains intact. The naval phase is just beginning.
For Lithuania: Baltic maritime defense should study this model. Swarms of small, cheap, missile-armed platforms — naval drones, fast attack craft — are more survivable and cost-effective than a few high-value assets. For Klaipeda port defense and Baltic Sea denial, the "mosquito fleet" concept deserves serious study.
Lesson 6: Coalition Political Fragility
Kuwait, the UAE, and Bahrain are under Iranian bombardment for hosting US bases. The US has completely withdrawn from the UAE. Iran targeted the US embassy in Kuwait.
The conflict is rapidly regionalizing — Iranian strikes on civilian areas in host countries are creating domestic political pressure to expel coalition forces.
For Lithuania: Baltic states hosting NATO forward-deployed forces would face identical dynamics under Russian missile strikes on Vilnius, Riga, or Tallinn. Political resilience — public communication, civil defense infrastructure, continuity of government planning — is as important as military capability.
The Strategic Risk: Where Is America Looking?
This may be the most consequential lesson for Lithuania.
The US has shifted 30+ tanker aircraft from Europe to the Middle East. Interceptor stocks being consumed in Iran are interceptors unavailable for European contingencies. A carrier strike group is committed to the Gulf. Political bandwidth in Washington is consumed by a war that could last 5 weeks and cost billions.
The Iran war is a live stress test of NATO's ability to handle two crises simultaneously. If Russia were to escalate in the Baltics — even with hybrid operations short of Article 5 — the US would be stretched thin.
Lithuania must:
- Accelerate European-only defense capabilities — Franco-German-Nordic cooperation
- Stop assuming US reinforcements will arrive in the first 72 hours of a crisis
- Push within NATO for explicit Baltic contingency guarantees that survive Middle East diversion
- Strengthen bilateral ties with Poland, Finland, and Sweden
Urgent Recommendations
| # | Action | Urgency |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Triple interceptor stockpile targets — Iran proves wartime consumption is 2-3x peacetime planning | Immediate |
| 2 | Mandate GPS-denied training across all Lithuanian armed forces | Immediate |
| 3 | Lobby NATO for European interceptor production surge — the US bottleneck is a transatlantic vulnerability | Immediate |
| 4 | Adopt decentralized C2 doctrine — every battalion autonomous for 72h without HQ | Short-term |
| 5 | Procure shoot-and-scoot air defense — mobility and autonomous operation | Short-term |
| 6 | Invest in layered air defense — gun and directed-energy for cheap threats | Short-term |
| 7 | Develop a "Baltic mosquito fleet" — naval drones for sea denial | Long-term |
Conclusion
The Iran war is still in its early days. Its outcome is uncertain — "sometimes just a few gusts of wind can cause major shifts in direction."
But the lessons for Lithuania are already clear: stockpile deeper, train harder for degraded conditions, decentralize everything, and never assume someone else will fight your war for you.
Lithuanian defense policymakers must act on these lessons now — not after the next crisis reaches our borders.
This analysis will be updated as the conflict develops. Follow @pati_marins64 for real-time military analysis of the Iran conflict.