Executive Summary
Ukrainian data from 2024 to 2026 shows 50 to 200 simultaneous Shahed and FPV launches routinely exceed a single battery's capacity. The Iran 39-day war of March to April 2026 confirmed it at scale: roughly 1,471 ballistic missiles depleted Gulf-based PAC-3 stocks by about 86 percent. A sovereign offensive option must include synchronised multi-drone strike, not unitary loitering munitions alone. Lithuania has Granta Autonomy on FPV airframes and Brolis Defence on sensors, but no domestic prime supplies the coordination layer. Reference systems include Anduril Lattice and Shield AI V-Bat; Helsing paused its HX-2 line in January 2026 after Bloomberg reported a 25 percent take-off failure rate. The recommended next step is a Ministry of National Defence feasibility study on a sovereign coordination capability above the existing FPV line, covering the autonomy stack, mesh networking, an Article 36 Geneva Conventions review for autonomous targeting, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 human-on-the-loop standard, and fit within the 2026 defence budget of 4.79 billion euros. Final selection is a Lithuanian determination.
The Problem
Russian saturation tactics have moved from harassment to doctrine. Geran-3 jet variants cruise at 300 to 370 km/h with a 9 km ceiling; Lancet 3M loitering munitions and Shahed family drones launch in waves of 50 to 200 against fixed targets. The arithmetic is now public: a battery with thirty ready interceptors against a hundred-drone swarm guarantees seventy-plus penetrations if arrival is synchronised. The 39-day Iran war of March to April 2026 confirmed this at strategic scale — 1,471 ballistic missiles depleted regional PAC-3 stocks by about 86 percent.
Lithuania can build FPV drones at scale through the sister mass-production line and can buy unitary loitering munitions, but has no sovereign software that lets fifty to two hundred airframes share targets, deconflict, and arrive together under jamming. Granta Autonomy ships an autonomy stack on its own airframe; no domestic prime ships a multi-vendor coordination layer. The legal framework for autonomous target selection is also unsettled: the Šakalienė amendments of 23 September 2025 cover airspace defence only and are not a cross-border swarm-attack predicate.
Without action: Lithuania remains dependent on foreign autonomy stacks for any offensive swarm option, fielded at the vendor's release cadence rather than the operator's, and exposed to export-licence withdrawal in a crisis.
Lithuanian Context
Lithuania already has FPV airframes and sensors at home; the missing layer is the multi-agent coordination software and the legal-doctrinal framework around autonomous targeting. Any sovereign system fielded for use of force must clear Article 36 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions and the Tallinn Manual 2.0 human-on-the-loop standard. The Šakalienė airspace amendments do not cover cross-border offensive employment.