Executive Summary
Russia fires low-cost long-range drones, mainly the Shahed and its Russian Geran-2 derivative, in salvos of more than a hundred. One drone costs 20,000 to 50,000 euros; a Patriot interceptor costs three to four million. That maths cannot be sustained. In Ukraine, the 11th Army Aviation Brigade trains civilian pilots, many former hobbyists, to fly Yak-52 trainers and engage slow drones with rifles and shotguns; the programme is credited with several hundred kills and 10 to 12 percent of daily intercepts. The newer jet-powered Geran-3 narrows that window but does not close it against the slower drones still in the mix. Lithuania has an estimated 3,000 licensed private pilots, an active KASP auxiliary, and, since the 23 September 2025 airspace amendments, a clearer legal predicate for civilian-aircraft drone interception. The recommended next step is a feasibility study by the Ministry of National Defence with the Civil Aviation Authority, KASP, and the Seimas, examining safety over inhabited terrain, fit with Operation Eastern Sentry and the Baltic Drone Wall, and how any unit relates to the Merops, AIM-9X, NASAMS, and Skyranger procurements announced April 2026. Shape is Lithuania's to determine.
The Problem
Long-range one-way attack drones (Shahed-136 and the Russian-built Geran-2 derivative) cruise at roughly 180 km/h, fly low, and arrive in saturating salvos. The newer jet-powered Geran-3 cruises faster, around 300 to 370 km/h, with a terminal dash reported up to 600 km/h — fast enough to outrun a propeller-driven trainer. Russia has scaled production into the tens of thousands per year. Polish airspace was breached on 9-10 September 2025 by 19 to 23 drones, triggering NATO consultations under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and the launch of Operation Eastern Sentry on 12 September 2025.
Lithuania's air defence is being reinforced quickly — 48 Merops AS-3 counter-drone systems announced 22 April 2026, a 214-million-dollar AIM-9X package on 24 April 2026, an additional 234-million-euro NASAMS tranche, and Skyranger 30 cannons under host-nation arrangements — but every one of those interceptors is far more expensive than the drone it engages. There is no low-cost manned layer that can absorb part of the daily traffic and preserve the missile stockpile for high-value targets such as cruise missiles and crewed aircraft.
Without action: Without a cheap layer, Lithuania spends million-euro interceptors against thirty-thousand-euro drones. The exchange ratio favours the attacker, missile stocks deplete during the first weeks of a sustained campaign, and the country reaches the point Ukraine reached in 2024 with no domestic alternative ready.
Lithuanian Context
Lithuania has an estimated 3,000 licensed private pilots (figure to verify with the Civil Aviation Authority) and the KASP volunteer auxiliary as a ready legal home for reserve status. The Šakalienė amendments of 23 September 2025, which apply to airspace only, give a clearer legal predicate for civilian aircraft engaging hostile drones than existed in 2024. FAA and EASA aviation-safety norms still constrain firing from civilian aircraft over inhabited terrain; any Lithuanian programme would have to design around those constraints, not assume them away. The Geran-3 jet variant is too fast for prop-driven tail-chase, so any unit would need clear rules on which threats it engages and which it leaves to Merops, AIM-9X, NASAMS, and Skyranger 30.