Executive Summary
Ukraine showed both sides of this question. President Zelensky created the International Legion of the Defence of Ukraine on 27 February 2022, three days into the war. Roughly 20,000 volunteers from 50+ countries served; early intake was unvetted and mixed combat veterans with adventurers and hostile-intelligence plants. Israel has run the Mahal programme since 1948; France and Spain run institutional Foreign Legions with full legal status. Lithuania has none of this. The Riflemen Union (LSS, around 17,000 members) and the KASP volunteer auxiliary admit only Lithuanian, EU and NATO citizens; 2024-25 amendments bar Russian, Belarusian and Chinese passport-holders. The inverse problem — how to receive, vet, and integrate trusted foreign volunteers under Geneva Convention Article 47 combatant status — has no statutory answer. The recommended next step is a feasibility study by the Ministry of National Defence and the Ministry of Justice, with Seimas Committee on National Security and Defence input, covering legal status (Article 47 integration into the regular armed forces), counter-intelligence vetting via allied service records, benefits and post-service residency, and command integration. Whether the framework sits inside LSS, KASP, or a new structure is a Lithuanian determination.
The Problem
If Russian or Belarusian forces cross the 35km Belarus border or the Suwalki corridor, allied citizens, Lithuanian diaspora, and Belarusian opposition fighters (the Pahonia Regiment precedent in Ukraine) will arrive at recruitment points within days. Three failures follow without a pre-built framework. Volunteers cannot be lawfully armed (neither citizens nor regular soldiers). Hostile intelligence uses the volunteer flow as cover, as Russian services did against the Ukrainian Legion in March-April 2022. Geneva Article 47 combatant protection cannot be claimed by fighters not formally integrated into the regular armed forces.
No statute authorises a non-EU, non-NATO volunteer (Ukrainian, Georgian, Belarusian opposition, Moldovan) to be issued a Lithuanian weapon, integrated into a Lithuanian unit, or claim combatant status under Lithuanian command. The LSS and KASP statutes do not contemplate this category.
Without action: On day one of a border breach, willing foreign volunteers are turned away or armed unlawfully. Hostile intelligence exploits the gap. Allied weapon-transfer rules cannot be honoured because Lithuania cannot certify the receiving fighter as an integrated combatant.
Lithuanian Context
Lithuania has a substantial diaspora (United Kingdom, Ireland, United States, Germany), a Belarusian opposition presence (Pahonia Regiment veterans), and an existing Riflemen Union culture that can absorb a foreign-volunteer cell. The framework should be designed for trusted partner nationals and verified diaspora, not generalised foreign-fighter recruitment, given the EU-wide political sensitivity of the foreign-fighter category since the Syria-returnee experience.