Executive Summary
In April 2026 Lithuania committed to 48 Merops AS-3 strike drones, a 234 million euro NASAMS package, 214 million dollars of AIM-9X missiles, and a Skyranger 30 counter-drone system for the German Panzerbrigade 45. The September 2025 Šakalienė amendments give Lithuanian forces legal authority to engage hostile drones in national airspace. Domestic prime Granta Autonomy was producing several hundred first-person-view (FPV) drones per month in early 2026 (dronelife.com). The human pipeline lags the kit. A mass-training pipeline could close the gap. Reference models: Ukrainian schools (six-to-eight-week course; 20 to 30 percent hit rate in heavy electronic-warfare conditions; three million FPV drones delivered in 2025, eight million capacity targeted for 2026), the Yak-52 drone-interception unit (300-plus Shahed kills), and the NATO Drone Coalition (Latvia and UK co-leads, 20 signatories, 30,000 drones / 2.75 billion euros in 2025). The recommended next step is a Ministry of National Defence study with KASP volunteer-auxiliary input on throughput, simulator ratio, gaming recruitment, Ukrainian instructors, STANAG 4670, and the 145 million euro fiscal-year-2026 counter-drone line. Final scope is for Lithuania to determine.
The Problem
Russian forces fly small drones into Baltic airspace routinely. Two Russian Gerbera decoy drones from Belarus crossed into Lithuanian airspace in July 2025; one was recovered five days later near a strategic energy site. Repurposed meteorological balloons closed Vilnius International Airport for more than 60 cumulative hours in late 2025, affecting over 51,000 passengers. GPS jamming across the region is now persistent. Ukrainian combat data shows that an effective infantry battalion needs 30 to 50 trained drone operators across reconnaissance, strike, and artillery-spotting roles, and that exposure of more than 15 minutes in open terrain is frequently fatal.
Lithuania has procured drones, counter-drone kit, and a domestic FPV production base (Granta Autonomy ramping from several hundred per month in early 2026), but published throughput from Lithuanian Armed Forces and KASP operator schools does not match the Ukrainian operator-density benchmarks. Ukrainian schools train operators in six to eight weeks; sustained first-person-view hit probability in heavy electronic-warfare environments is 20 to 30 percent, not the 60-to-70-percent figure cited in earlier drafts of this initiative. Without a published pipeline plan, equipment outpaces the people to use it.
Without action: Procured systems sit underused. The September 2025 legal authority to engage hostile drones in airspace (Šakalienė amendments, airspace only) has fewer trained operators to exercise it. KASP volunteers with civilian remote-control-aircraft and FPV experience remain an untapped pool.
Lithuanian Context
Vilnius sits 35 kilometres from Belarus and 100 kilometres from Kaliningrad. The Suwalki corridor is 80 kilometres of NATO's only land link to the Baltics. The KASP volunteer auxiliary already contains civilian remote-control-aircraft and FPV pilots; whether the right answer is a single national academy, a KASP-led volunteer track, an expanded existing school, or a partnership with Granta Autonomy and Ukrainian instructors is a Lithuanian determination.