Advanced Anti-Tank Mine Stockpile and Delivery Systems

Executive Summary

Anti-tank mines were the weapon that stopped Ukraine's 2023 summer counter-offensive at the Surovikin Line and the weapon that has cost Russia a large share of its armour losses since 2022. A modern anti-tank mine costs a few hundred to a few thousand euros and can disable a tank that costs two to five million euros. Lithuania's public posture on anti-tank mine stockpiles, intelligent fuzes, and scatterable delivery is thin compared with Poland's Shield East programme, which has earmarked roughly 5,500 square kilometres of border-area engineering preparation including pre-surveyed mine emplacement positions. Lithuania withdrew from the Ottawa Treaty on anti-personnel mines on 18 February 2025 alongside Estonia, Latvia, Poland, and Finland. Anti-tank mines were never under Ottawa, but the political space for mine-based defence has shifted. The recommended next step is a Ministry of National Defence study, with Engineer Corps and industry input, scoping intelligent anti-tank mine procurement (magnetic-influence and top-attack fuzes such as the M93 Hornet wide-area munition family), scatterable delivery options (artillery, helicopter, and drone-laid systems), and integration with the Lithuanian Defence Line trench-and-drone reframe. Vendor mix, stockpile depth, and emplacement doctrine are sovereign Lithuanian decisions.

The Problem

Russian doctrine still relies on massed armoured thrusts. In Ukraine, mines have caused a large share of Russian vehicle losses; Russian breaching units (BMR-3M, Uran-6) and counter-mine drones exist but are scarce and slow. The August 2023 Ukrainian assault on Robotyne and Verbove breached the Surovikin Line but at severe cost, with leopard 2 and Bradley losses concentrated in mine belts. A Lithuanian defensive scenario faces the same arithmetic in reverse: Russian armour pushing west from Belarus or Kaliningrad must cross terrain that has been engineered, or it does not.

Lithuania has no public indigenous anti-tank mine production. EU-source candidates include Polish Mesko, Finnish Forcit, and Norwegian Nammo. There is no public scatterable mine delivery capability (no Volcano-class vehicle dispenser, no artillery-delivered RAAM-class round, no drone-laid scatterable). Doctrine integration with the Lithuanian Defence Line — which has been reframed around drones, mines, and trenches — needs an updated engineer plan, marking standards, and recording protocols so cleared lanes can be used and re-mined under fire.