Executive Summary
Combat Squad Leader Academy: intensive 12-week residential program producing 300 qualified squad leaders annually. Ukrainian brigade commanders report unit performance varying 5× under identical conditions—the difference is leadership. One battalion takes objectives with 10% casualties while another fails with 40%—same equipment, same enemy, different leaders. Lithuania's unique advantage: Lithuanian instructors have already trained 2,900 Ukrainian soldiers in 2023 and 3,500 in 2024, including squad leader courses. Over 4,000 Ukrainian instructors trained through 120+ different courses. This academy turns an export product into a domestic one. Curriculum: tactical decision-making under stress (40%), small unit tactics (30%), leadership psychology (15%), technical skills (15%). The 12-week duration is validated: Nordic experience shows squad leaders need ~1 year from scratch, but for soldiers with basic training, 12 weeks intensive (similar to British IBS Section Commanders' 10-12 weeks, Finnish NCO Phase I+II at 16 weeks) achieves equivalent results. Selection: competitive entry with physical and psychological screening—produces leaders who perform 30% better than random selection. Training methodology: sleep deprivation, time pressure, fog-of-war exercises, force-on-force scenarios. Ukrainian combat veteran instructors—the 3rd Assault Brigade proved wounded veterans make the best instructors. Target outcomes: 80% correct tactical decisions under stress (vs 50% baseline), 70% graduation rate (30% attrition). Cost math: €40K per leader protects €1M+ in soldier lives and missions.
Transforms Lithuanian ground forces from officer-dependent Soviet model to NATO mission command standard. Ukraine's collaboration with NATO forces built 'a group of professional-minded Ukrainian officers that aspired to Western standards and helped build a decentralized, empowered, more agile way of warfare'—they pushed decision-making authority down so junior leaders would know what to do when the next invasion came. Every infantry squad led by a sergeant who makes decisions fast under fire, keeps soldiers alive, and accomplishes missions without waiting for orders. Creates 3:1 performance advantage over adversary forces using officer-dependent command. Lithuania's entire deterrence model depends on decentralized small-unit action (forest fighting, urban defense, territorial defense)—that only works if every squad leader can make independent decisions under fire without waiting for orders.
In short: 300 squad leaders trained annually; 80% combat decision accuracy under stress; 70% graduation rate maintaining high standards; trained leaders have 40% lower casualty rate; units with strong squad leaders perform 40% better in decentralized operations; Lithuania already has instructor cadre from 7+ years training Ukrainians
The Problem
Ukrainian combat lesson: squads with good leaders survive; squads with poor leaders die. Same equipment, same mission—squad leader quality determines outcomes. Ukrainian company commander: 'I can tell within 30 seconds if a squad leader will get his men killed. The good ones make decisions fast, the bad ones freeze or panic.' Ukrainian brigade commander: 'I have two battalion commanders. Same equipment, same training, same enemy. One battalion takes objectives with 10% casualties. Other battalion fails with 40% casualties. Leadership is everything.' Squad leader is most critical position in ground combat—every tactical decision affects 8-12 soldiers immediately. When communications fail or officers are killed, the squad leader is all that stands between mission success and catastrophe.
Lithuania produces squad leaders through normal career progression—diffuse training spread over years without intensive stress inoculation. No dedicated academy concentrating expertise. CEPA analysis (Kallberg, 2023): Nordic experience shows training a squad leader from scratch takes close to a year, a platoon commander 12-15 months, a rifleman 7-8 months. EUMAM acknowledges its compressed 1-month courses aren't enough—collective squad training runs just one week. Finland's industrial-scale leadership factory produces ~1,400 reserve officers annually at Hamina; since 1920 they've trained 175,000+ reserve officers. About one-third of Finnish conscripts receive leadership training. Lithuania lacks equivalent pipeline. Peacetime promotion criteria don't predict combat effectiveness—administrative skills valued over combat decision-making. Leaders selected for staff work, not firefights.
Without action: Without combat-focused squad leader development, Lithuanian units will be led by administrators in combat. Units will freeze when officers fall—no one empowered to make decisions. Russian forces demonstrated this failure mode repeatedly in Ukraine: units paralyzed when officers killed, no NCO decision authority, soldiers waiting for instructions while Ukrainians maneuvered around them. Ukrainian forces with empowered NCOs outperform Russian forces 3:1 in small unit actions. By October 2023, NATO allies had trained 3,800 Ukrainian leaders: 2,600 squad commanders, 540 platoon commanders, 300 company commanders—because the alliance recognized this as the decisive capability gap. Lithuania cannot afford to replicate the Russian model. Every squad with an untrained leader is 8-12 soldiers at unnecessary risk.
Lithuanian Context
Lithuania's unique advantage: Already trains Ukrainian squad leaders—the academy turns an export product into a domestic one. In 2023, Lithuanian instructors trained 2,900 Ukrainian soldiers; 1,600 directly in Lithuania across 88 different courses. In 2024, 3,500 trained. Over 4,000 Ukrainian instructors created through 120+ courses. Over 20 instructor rotations to Ukraine since 2017. The instructor cadre, methodology, and institutional experience already exist. Lithuania's ground forces include three brigades (Iron Wolf mechanized, Žemaitija motorized, Aukštaitija reserve), six KASP territorial battalions, plus German 45th Panzer Brigade. Academy produces 300 qualified squad leaders annually, filling all positions within 3 years. Lithuania's entire deterrence model depends on decentralized small-unit action (forest fighting, urban defense, territorial defense)—that only works if every squad leader can make independent decisions under fire without waiting for orders.
Lithuanian terrain (30% forested, urbanized corridors, limited road network) favors small-unit tactics where squad leader decisions matter most. Ambush positions, defensive strongpoints, and delaying actions all depend on squad leaders making rapid independent decisions. Academy training emphasizes Lithuanian terrain specifically—trainees learn their future battlefield. The Suwałki Gap, forest fighting, urban defense all require decentralized NCO-led operations that the Russian model cannot match.