Executive Summary
Light Aircraft Interception Unit: 80 civilian pilots (agricultural, sport aviation) trained for drone interception following the Ukrainian 11th Army Aviation Brigade model. The program accounts for 10-12% of daily drone interceptions in Ukraine at a fraction of missile costs. Aircraft equipped with rifles (Haenel MK556) or shotguns, with option for WWII-style wing-tipping technique. Integration with air defense radar network for vectoring to within 200-300 feet of target. 15-minute scramble time from alert. Pilot compensation: reserve military status with flight-hour pay. Complements NATO Baltic Drone Wall initiative and FPV interceptor programs. Target: 80 pilots on-call, 40 aircraft available, €500 average cost per interception vs €38,000 Stinger or €3-4 million Patriot PAC-3.
Creates sustainable cost-exchange ratio in drone defense; Preserves expensive missile systems for high-value targets; Mobilizes Lithuania's 500+ certified civilian pilots as untapped defense resource; Integrates with NATO Baltic Drone Wall layered defense concept
In short: 80 trained interception pilots; 40 equipped aircraft; €500 per interception vs €38,000-€4M for missiles; 10-12% of daily interceptions (Ukrainian model); 15-minute scramble time; Integration with Baltic Drone Wall
The Problem
Shahed drones fly at 180 km/h, cost $20,000-$50,000 each. Russia launched 7,974 drones against Ukraine between March 1 and May 12, 2025 alone—averaging 110 per attack and 125 per day in first half of 2025 (2.4x increase from 2024). Russia produces an estimated 50,000-70,000 Shahed-style drones annually, already exceeding NATO's defensive capacity. The fundamental problem: intercepting a $35,000 drone with a $3-4 million Patriot missile creates a 100:1 cost disadvantage. Using NASAMS ($500K-$1.2M per interceptor) or even Stinger ($38,000) remains economically unsustainable at scale. Ukraine requires approximately 4,800 anti-air missiles annually representing $2.4-19.2 billion just for interceptor ammunition. This 'missile-financial balance' favors the attacker.
Lithuania lacks dedicated low-cost counter-UAS capability for slow, low-flying loitering munitions; Existing air defense optimized for aircraft and cruise missiles, not swarm drone attacks; No integration of civilian aviation assets into air defense architecture; No legal framework for civilian pilot participation in defense; 500+ certified pilots and 200+ light aircraft represent untapped resource
Without action: Economic attrition: Defending against 100 Shaheds monthly with missiles costs €3.8-40M vs €50K with light aircraft. Without low-cost layer, Lithuania depletes expensive missile stocks while Russia maintains production advantage. As demonstrated in Ukraine: 90% of Shaheds intercepted but at unsustainable cost ratios. NATO cannot win attrition war using current missile-centric approach against mass drone attacks.
Lithuanian Context
Lithuania faces growing drone threat as Russia scales Shahed production to 50,000-70,000 annually. Current missile-based air defense economically unsustainable against mass drone attacks. Lithuania possesses 500+ certified civilian pilots and 200+ light aircraft—an untapped air defense resource. Light aircraft interception program creates cost-effective layer complementing NATO Baltic Drone Wall initiative and Lithuania's €300 million drone/EW investment through 2030.
Lithuania's compact geography (65,300 km²) enables effective coverage from 8-10 dispersed airfields. Flat terrain favorable for light aircraft operations. Proximity to Kaliningrad and Belarus creates short warning times requiring rapid scramble capability. Integration with Estonian and Latvian programs possible for Baltic-wide coverage.