Initiatives/Strategy
Strategy

Total National Mobilization Doctrine

Transform Lithuania into an 'indigestible society' through universal conscription, six-pillar Total Defense, and deterrence by resilience.

Executive Summary

Lithuania's current selective conscription (~3,500/year) is inadequate for a nation facing existential threat 35km from its capital. This initiative implements universal mandatory military service combined with a comprehensive six-pillar Total Defense framework: (1) Military Defense—300,000+ trained reserves through universal conscription; (2) Civil Defense—population trained in survival, first aid, resistance; (3) Economic Defense—Swiss-model mandatory stockpiling, supply chain resilience; (4) Psychological Defense—cognitive security against disinformation using Swedish DIDI model; (5) Digital Defense—decentralized mesh communications (LoRa/Meshtastic), civilian intelligence apps; (6) Social Defense—community cohesion, resistance organization in every municipality. The strategic concept is 'deterrence by resilience': when an adversary realizes that capturing territory results only in prolonged, technologically sophisticated insurgency, the utility of invasion is neutralized. Drawing on Finland's 900,000 reserves, Singapore's six pillars, Switzerland's economic mandates, and Ukraine's digital resistance, Lithuania becomes not a target but an armed nation where occupation means facing endless, coordinated resistance.

critical

In short: Transforms Lithuania from potential target into indigestible society; creates 300,000+ trained reserves; establishes six-pillar resilience framework; implements deterrence by resilience doctrine

The Problem

In a worst-case scenario, Russian forces could temporarily overwhelm Lithuanian conventional defenses before NATO reinforcement arrives. Russia's war aims could include occupation of territory, installation of puppet government, or annexation. Historical Russian occupation of the Baltics (1940-1990) demonstrates the threat is real. Without organized resistance capability, occupation could consolidate before liberation.

Lithuania reintroduced conscription in 2015 but only selectively—~3,500 conscripts/year is grossly insufficient. Active military ~23,000, reserves ~30,000. Compare to Finland: 900,000 reserves from 5.5M population. Lithuania should have 250,000-300,000 trained reserves but has fraction of that. Current civil defense focused on passive protection. Riflemen's Union (Šaulių Sąjunga) has only ~11,000 members. No comprehensive mobilization framework exists.

Without action: Occupation could consolidate. Resistance would emerge but delayed and less effective. Strategic deterrent value lost - Russia might calculate occupation is feasible.

Lithuanian Context

Lithuania's small size means conventional defense may be overwhelmed before reinforcement. Total Defense provides depth by making occupation impossibly costly. Historical Forest Brothers tradition shows Lithuanian willingness to resist. NATO membership provides ultimate security, but Total Defense ensures no gap in defense.

Forested areas (33% coverage) suitable for resistance. Urban areas (67% population) require different approach. Lake district provides natural refuges.

Total Defense meets NATO Baseline Requirements for resilience. Contributes to collective defense by ensuring no easy Russian victory. Buys time for NATO reinforcement.