Executive Summary
The strategic landscape for European nuclear deterrence transformed in 2025. The Northwood Declaration (July 2025) established unprecedented UK-France nuclear coordination, creating a framework that is now expanding rapidly. In May 2025, President Macron stated he is 'open to discussions about deploying French nuclear weapons to European countries that request them'—his clearest signal yet. Seven European nations have now expressed openness: Sweden (in active negotiations), Poland (pursuing most aggressively), Germany (64% public support, Chancellor Merz calling for talks), Lithuania (President Nausėda supportive), Denmark (PM Frederiksen: 'Everything has to be on the table'), Latvia, and Finland. Lithuanian President Nausėda told Macron directly that Lithuania wanted coverage under France's nuclear umbrella. Defence Minister Šakalienė stated Lithuania would consider 'realistic plans for deployment of nuclear weapons or their components' even if requiring constitutional amendment. A Nordic-Baltic-Poland regional bloc is emerging as potential framework for collective engagement with France. This initiative pursues Lithuanian participation in the emerging European nuclear deterrence architecture through the Northwood Declaration framework, positioning Lithuania alongside Sweden and Poland in what Europeans frame as a 'second insurance policy' complementing US extended deterrence.
Positions Lithuania within the rapidly emerging European nuclear architecture. Swedish PM Kristersson's framing applies: 'As long as dangerous countries possess nuclear weapons, sound democracies must also have access to nuclear weapons.' Creates European nuclear deterrence commitment independent of any single nation's political decisions. French Rafales already deploy to northern Sweden—similar arrangements for Lithuania are operationally feasible.
In short: Diversifies nuclear deterrence to include independent French capability under the Northwood Declaration framework. Creates 'second insurance policy' complementing US extended deterrence. Transforms Baltic region into territory under explicit European nuclear protection. Positions Lithuania within emerging Nordic-Baltic-Poland nuclear cooperation bloc alongside seven other interested nations.
The Problem
Russia possesses thousands of tactical nuclear weapons and has repeatedly made nuclear threats in the context of the Ukraine conflict. Russian doctrine contemplates nuclear use to 'de-escalate' conventional conflicts. European nations are responding by building diversified nuclear deterrence architecture. Germany's Chancellor Merz stated the need for discussions with France and UK 'about whether nuclear sharing, or at least nuclear security from the UK and France, could also apply to us.'
NATO nuclear sharing involves only US B61 bombs stationed in Western Europe (Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey). No nuclear weapons are deployed in the Baltic region. The Northwood Declaration (July 2025) creates new European framework now expanding to include Sweden, with Poland, Germany, Denmark, and the Baltic states expressing interest. Lithuania has expressed interest through President Nausėda but has not yet secured formal inclusion in the emerging architecture.
Without action: The European nuclear architecture is evolving rapidly—seven nations have now expressed openness to French nuclear coverage. Poland is pursuing most aggressively and may establish the model for Eastern European inclusion. Sweden is already negotiating. If Lithuania does not actively engage, it risks being left outside the emerging framework while neighbors secure French commitments. Regional credibility gap would emerge if Sweden and Poland secure coverage but Lithuania does not.
Lithuanian Context
Lithuania occupies NATO's most exposed position—Vilnius 35km from Belarus, the Suwalki Gap creating potential isolation. Lithuanian President Nausėda: 'A nuclear umbrella would serve as really very serious deterrence towards Russia. It's very important to use this opportunity to increase our resilience, especially on the eastern flank, because it is exposed to different kinds of threats.' Nausėda told Macron directly that Lithuania wanted coverage. Defence Minister Šakalienė confirmed Lithuania would consider 'realistic plans for deployment of nuclear weapons or their components' even if requiring constitutional amendment. Seven European nations have now expressed interest—Lithuania is positioned to join this emerging architecture.
Baltic position provides visible deterrent signal to Russia. Multiple suitable airfield locations exist for nuclear-capable aircraft. French Rafales already deploy to northern Sweden (April 2025)—similar deployments to Lithuania operationally feasible and would demonstrate capability. Central location among Baltic states could provide regional umbrella effect. Analysts propose forward-deploying French capabilities to 'Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania—the new frontline states.'