Executive Summary
Russia's systematic campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure has destroyed over 50% of Ukraine's power generation capacity. Lithuania's smaller, more concentrated grid is even more vulnerable—a few successful strikes could cripple the country. This initiative combines two complementary strategies: (1) Hardening of critical nodes through physical barriers, redundant transmission, and rapid repair capability; (2) Massive decentralization of energy production through solar mandates, wind acceleration, biogas programs, microgrids for critical facilities, battery storage, and regulatory reform to enable prosumers. Target: add 2,000+ MW of distributed generation capacity, achieve energy independence for all critical facilities, and ensure no single attack can disable more than 10% of national power. The Ukrainian lesson is clear—centralized grids are strategic vulnerabilities; distributed generation is strategic resilience.
Ensures power continuity under sustained attack; denies Russia strategic victory through infrastructure destruction; maintains military and civilian functionality; economic resilience
In short: 2,000+ MW distributed generation; critical facility energy independence; no single point of failure >10% of grid; physical hardening of remaining centralized assets; transformation from vulnerability to resilience
The Problem
Russia has demonstrated sustained willingness and capability to systematically destroy civilian energy infrastructure. In Ukraine, Russia launched thousands of drones and missiles specifically targeting power plants, substations, and transmission infrastructure. The campaign has destroyed thermal and hydro plants, damaged nuclear facilities, and repeatedly attacked the transmission grid. Centralized energy systems are inherently vulnerable—a few critical nodes control the entire grid.
Lithuanian energy infrastructure suffers from dangerous centralization. Key nodes (Kruonis pumped storage, Elektrenai plant, major substations) represent single points of failure—losing 3-4 facilities could collapse the grid. Limited distributed generation capacity. Bureaucratic barriers prevent prosumer expansion. Micro-hydro potential suppressed by over-regulation. No energy independence for critical facilities (hospitals, water treatment, military bases). Insufficient battery storage for grid stability. No physical hardening against air attack.
Without action: Ukraine-level infrastructure destruction possible within weeks of conflict. Loss of 50%+ power generation. Civilian suffering, economic collapse, degraded military operations. Strategic defeat without territorial loss. Hospitals without power, water treatment fails, communications collapse.
Lithuanian Context
Lithuania's energy independence from Russia (achieved 2022 with LNG terminal and Poland synchronization) could be undermined by infrastructure destruction. Russia cannot cut supply but can destroy infrastructure. Small, concentrated grid means few targets for maximum effect. Vilnius area especially vulnerable given proximity to Belarus.
Flat terrain provides no natural protection. Belarus border 35km from Vilnius provides minimal warning time. Kruonis 100km from border. LNG terminal 300km from Kaliningrad.
- baseline requirements: Hardened grid meets NATO Baseline Requirements for Resilience—essential services maintained under attack
- military support: Enables continued operations at Rukla training grounds, Šiauliai airbase, NATO reinforcement logistics hubs
- entso e integration: Work within ENTSO-E Ten-Year Network Development Plan (TYNDP) to obtain 'Projects of Common Interest' (PCI) status for hardening projects, unlocking EU funding
- emergency imports: Synchronization with ENTSO-E enables emergency imports from Poland/Sweden—but only useful if internal transmission intact