Executive Summary
The proliferation of one-way attack (OWA) UAS—Shahed-136/Geran-2 at $20-50K per unit—has fundamentally altered territorial defense calculus. Traditional SAMs create 'economic kill' scenarios: a $1.2M AMRAAM against a $30K drone represents $1.1M value loss per engagement. In sustained conflict, defenders deplete finite high-value interceptors on low-value targets, leaving airspace open to cruise missiles and manned aviation. This initiative establishes a Defensive Drone Interceptor Fleet achieving near 1:1 or better cost-exchange ratios. Ukrainian operational proof validates the concept: the Dronefall project achieved 10,000+ confirmed interceptions by late 2025, accounting for 12% of all Shaheds launched in October 2025. Wild Hornets 'Sting' interceptors (315+ km/h) achieve 60-90% success rates; a single operator destroyed 24 drones in one night. Cost ratios: Merops at 1:2, Sting at 1:12-14, modified FPV at 1:30-60. Critical enabler: AI terminal guidance. The TFL Anti-Shahed module ($300) provides autonomous target lock at closing speeds exceeding 100 m/s where human latency fails. This 'human-in-the-loop, AI-on-the-target' approach handles mass swarms while providing EW resilience—onboard processing continues mission even in GPS-denied environments. For Lithuania—679km Belarus border, Vilnius 35km from border—the interceptor fleet provides strategic depth. September 2025 Seimas amendments authorize instant reaction against drone threats. Domestic industry (Granta X-Wing, NT Service SkyWiper) provides sovereign capability. Integration with NATO SAPIENT protocol and FAAD C2 ensures interoperability. This is the 'democratization of air defense'—a strategic necessity for small nations facing autonomous attrition warfare.
Achieves 'true strategic deterrence' by deploying platforms costing less than targets. Addresses 'production vs. consumption asymmetry'—Ukraine requires 4,800 anti-air missiles annually at $500K+ each; drone interceptors manufactured in thousands monthly. Keeps high-tier air defense 'silent' against decoys, preserving electronic element of surprise. Provides dual-use flexibility—same fleet repurposable for reconnaissance or strike if threat environment shifts.
In short: Cost-exchange ratio 1:12 to 1:60 vs Shahed threats; 10,000+ Ukrainian validated interceptions; AI autonomous terminal guidance (TFL module $300); NATO SAPIENT/FAAD C2 interoperable; domestic production capability (Granta); 24/7 distributed 'drone nest' deployment; preserves NASAMS/Patriot for high-value threats
The Problem
The Shahed-136 (Russian designation Geran-2) is an autonomous, pusher-propelled loitering munition with 2,500km range and 50kg warhead. Estimated production cost at Russian Alabuga facility: $30,000-80,000. When launched in swarms of 50-100 units, they present saturation challenge that legacy air defense cannot resolve economically. Russia prefers night attacks to exploit defender limitations.
Lithuania's cost-exchange ratios with current systems are unsustainable: Patriot PAC-3 ($3-4M) = 100:1 unfavorable; NASAMS AIM-120 ($1.2M) = 40:1; IRIS-T SL ($485K) = 16:1. Even specialized C-UAS like Coyote Block 2 ($100-125K) = 3:1 remains on 'losing side' of cost curve. No indigenous interceptor drone capability. No AI-enabled autonomous terminal guidance. Lithuania requires ~4,800 missiles annually at current Ukrainian interception rates—financially unsustainable.
Without action: Without cost-effective interceptor layer: (1) 'Economic kill' depletes finite missile stocks on low-value targets; (2) Airspace eventually opens to cruise missiles and manned aviation; (3) Infrastructure degradation similar to Ukraine—50%+ power generation loss; (4) Gerbera decoys successfully map radar signatures for future jamming; (5) Hybrid balloon threats remain unaddressed; (6) Production vs. consumption asymmetry guarantees defender exhaustion.
Lithuanian Context
Lithuania faces unique threat environment: 679km Belarus border, Vilnius only 35km from border. Warning times extremely short. September 2025 Seimas amendments provide legislative foundation for instant reaction—Defense Minister or authorized person can order immediate downing of drone violating airspace. Legacy laws were not adapted to modern threats like Gerbera decoys and Shahed strikes.
679km Belarus border is primary threat vector for ShahedsVilnius only 35km from border—extremely short warning timesFlat terrain favors drone operationsForested areas provide concealment for launch sitesUrban areas (Vilnius, Kaunas, Klaipėda) are primary protection priorities