Executive Summary
Russian military operations are critically dependent on space-based assets: GLONASS provides precision navigation for Iskander-M and cruise missiles; the Liana network (Lotos-S ELINT, Pion-NKS radar) enables maritime targeting; EKS/Kupol provides strategic missile warning; and military SATCOM networks (Blagovest, Meridian-M, emerging Rassvet) enable command and control across the vast Russian theater. As of 2026, Russia maintains approximately 100+ military satellites across these constellations, with critical vulnerabilities in the EKS early warning system (potentially only 1-4 of 6 Tundra satellites operational) and delays in the Rassvet LEO constellation (only 6 of planned 900 satellites deployed). This initiative develops Lithuanian contributions to NATO counter-space capabilities across four domains: (1) Electronic warfare/jamming against GLONASS and SATCOM downlinks; (2) Cyber operations against ground control segments (Titov Centre, Vostochny integration); (3) Directed energy systems for satellite sensor degradation; (4) Kinetic ASAT contribution through NATO pooling. Lithuania's niche contribution focuses on ground-based electronic denial and cyber access to Russian space ground infrastructure, leveraging proximity to Kaliningrad and existing SIGINT/cyber capabilities. The strategic rationale is asymmetric deterrence: degrading Russian space capabilities eliminates precision strike guidance, blinds ISR enabling force maneuver, and disrupts C2 synchronization—all without requiring territorial defense of the space domain itself. A small investment in counter-space creates disproportionate impact on adversary military effectiveness.
Contributes to NATO counter-space architecture; degrades Russian precision warfare capability; creates deterrence through demonstrated ability to impose costs in space domain; provides escalation options below kinetic threshold
In short: Asymmetric capability to degrade Russian precision strike (GLONASS denial), blind ISR networks (Liana jamming), and disrupt C2 (SATCOM interference) at fraction of cost required for equivalent conventional force degradation
The Problem
Russian military operations depend critically on space-based assets: GLONASS enables precision strike (Iskander-M, cruise missiles); Liana network provides maritime targeting; military SATCOM synchronizes C2 across vast Russian theater. Without space support, Russian precision strike degrades to inertial guidance (CEP increases from meters to hundreds of meters), ISR blinds enabling force maneuver, and C2 desynchronizes.
Lithuania and NATO Baltic forces lack dedicated counter-space capabilities to deny Russian space-based advantages in regional conflict. While Russia routinely jams GPS across the Baltic, NATO forces have limited reciprocal GLONASS denial capability. Cyber access to space ground segments undeveloped. No directed energy capability against satellite sensors.
Without action: Russian precision strike capability remains fully effective against Lithuanian/NATO forces. Liana network enables real-time targeting of NATO naval assets in Baltic. Russian C2 maintains synchronization advantage. NATO forces operate in GPS-denied environment while Russia retains GLONASS. Asymmetric vulnerability persists.
Lithuanian Context
As a frontline NATO state facing Russian precision strike capability enabled by space assets, Lithuania requires counter-space capability to degrade adversary advantages. The asymmetric value is high: denying GLONASS costs millions while replacing GLONASS satellites costs billions; degrading space support eliminates Russian precision advantage without requiring equivalent conventional force.
Proximity to Kaliningrad enables GLONASS denial affecting Russian exclave operations. Baltic position provides observation opportunities for polar-orbit satellite passes. Compact national territory achievable for denial zone coverage.