Executive Summary
The proliferation of low-cost one-way attack drones (OWA-UAV) has inverted traditional air defense economics. A Shahed-136 costs $20,000-50,000 while interceptors range from $480,000 (Stinger) to $4,000,000 (Patriot PAC-3)—creating an 'economic kill chain' where defenders are exhausted before attacker arsenals deplete. Mass attacks of 100-200 drones daily (peaks exceeding 800) create a 'magazine depth crisis' for traditional batteries carrying only 4-16 missiles. This initiative establishes autonomous interceptor swarms targeting unit costs of 3,000-5,000 EUR—achieving cost parity with threats. High-speed platforms (350+ km/h electric, 450 km/h turbojet) carry AI targeting computers (YOLOv8 on Jetson Xavier, 8ms inference) with EO/IR sensor fusion for autonomous terminal engagement. Kinetic neutralization at 10,400+ Joules destroys Class I/II drones without explosives. Swarm coordination via Consensus-Based Bundle Algorithm (CBBA) enables decentralized target allocation resilient to jamming. Ukrainian combat experience validates this approach. Russian countermeasures (rear-facing sensors, evasive maneuvering, PTM-3 mine drops) confirm interceptor effectiveness. For Lithuania, integration with the European 'Drone Wall' initiative (projected €1B for Baltic/Poland coverage) provides layered defense of Klaipėda LNG, Vilnius grid, and interconnection infrastructure against sustained mass attacks from Kaliningrad/Belarus vectors.
Reclaims economic advantage from attacker; preserves high-value NASAMS/Patriot missiles for cruise/ballistic threats; provides persistent 24/7 counter-UAS capability; contributes to NATO Eastern Flank 'Drone Wall' initiative; establishes Lithuanian industrial base for interceptor production
In short: Achieves cost parity with OWA-UAV threats (€3-5K interceptor vs $20-50K Shahed); provides 'magazine depth' for sustained defense against mass attacks; enables safe kinetic engagement in urban/industrial areas without explosive risks
The Problem
Russia employs mass drone attacks against Ukrainian infrastructure nightly—100-200 drones daily with peaks exceeding 800 air attack vehicles in single large-scale operations. The emergence of jet-powered variants (Shahed-238/Geran-3) achieving 450+ km/h blurs distinctions between UAS and cruise missiles. Similar attacks against Baltic critical infrastructure would create an 'attrition trap' where defenders are exhausted financially and logistically before attacker arsenals deplete.
Lithuania's counter-UAS capabilities rely on expensive missiles (Patriot PAC-3: $4M; NASAMS AMRAAM: $1.2M; Stinger: $480K) or limited electronic warfare. Traditional batteries carry only 4-16 missiles per launcher, creating a 'magazine depth crisis' against mass attacks. No cost-effective kinetic counter exists at scale. The 'Wolfpack' tactic uses cheap drones to map and strip air defense coverage, paving way for cruise/ballistic strikes.
Without action: Mass drone attacks exhaust expensive air defense missiles within weeks. Lithuania's sophisticated NASAMS and Patriot batteries forced to choose between allowing Shaheds to hit infrastructure or depleting limited missile stocks. Critical infrastructure (Klaipėda LNG, Vilnius grid, LitPol/NordBalt links) becomes vulnerable to subsequent high-end cruise and ballistic missile strikes. Estimated $1B+ defensive expenditure in months (Operation Rough Rider precedent).
Lithuanian Context
Lithuania's limited defense budget cannot sustain expensive missile defense against cheap drones. The 'attrition trap' would exhaust high-value NASAMS/Patriot missiles within weeks of sustained mass attacks. Interceptor drone swarms provide cost-effective kinetic counter enabling sustainable defense while preserving strategic missiles for cruise/ballistic threats.
Small territory (65,300 km2) enables comprehensive interceptor coverage from limited bases. 65km proximity to Kaliningrad creates short warning time requiring rapid automated response. Critical infrastructure concentration defines priority protection areas for smart launcher positioning.
- iamd doctrine: Deep integration with NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defense doctrine required for successful deployment
- training standards: ATP 3.3.8.1 establishes minimum requirements for UAS operators—high-speed interceptors operating in 'Certified' category meet IFR and airspace coordination standards
- mdc2: Multi-Domain Command and Control integration enables real-time data streaming from interceptor swarm to regional operations centers (Denmark, Sweden)
- task force x baltic: Trials demonstrated rapid adoption of uncrewed systems into NATO maritime and aerial vigilance frameworks
- common operational picture: Interceptor swarm data contributes to Alliance COP, enabling operation alongside German or American air defense batteries