Executive Summary
This initiative adapts the logic of nuclear Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) to conventional precision-strike capabilities, following the 'Gaullist model' established by France's Force de Frappe program. The foundational premise—that aggression is deterred when retaliation is certain, survivable, and catastrophic—remains valid independent of nuclear weapons. The initiative aims for Lithuania to establish a Conventional MAD (C-MAD) framework: an indigenous arsenal of +500,000 autonomous strike platforms and 9,000 guided missiles capable of imposing strategic-level damage on adversary infrastructure, supported by domestically-controlled production facilities ensuring indefinite sustainment.
Transforms Lithuania from a dependent buffer state requiring external protection into an independent deterrent power capable of imposing unbearable strategic costs on any aggressor.
In short: Provides sovereign deterrence capability independent of alliance response timelines. Creates immediate, automatic consequences for territorial aggression that make any attack unbearable. Establishes permanent defense-industrial base generating employment and export revenue while ensuring Lithuania can never be disarmed through supply embargoes.
The Problem
Russian forces could initiate significant military operations within 24-72 hours of political decision. The Suwalki Gap, Lithuania's connection to NATO via Poland, represents NATO's most constrained line of communication. Vilnius lies 35 kilometers from Belarus, and Kaliningrad positions Russian forces 100 kilometers from the Lithuanian capital. This creates space for fait accompli strategies where territory is seized before alliance response materializes.
Lithuania lacks the capability to impose strategic-level costs on an aggressor independent of alliance response. Current forces can delay but not deter a determined adversary. No national precision-strike production exists. Dependence on foreign arms suppliers creates many vulnerability layers.
Without action: The temporal asymmetry between aggression timelines (hours) and NATO response timelines (days) remains exploitable. An aggressor might calculate that rapid action could present NATO with a fait accompli too costly to reverse. Lithuania remains dependent on external security guarantees that may not arrive in time, with little to no plan B in case of lack of response.
Lithuanian Context
Lithuania faces a fundamental temporal asymmetry: potential aggression within 24-72 hours versus NATO reinforcement over days. The Suwalki Gap makes Lithuania uniquely vulnerable to isolation. Conventional MAD eliminates this vulnerability by ensuring immediate strategic consequences for any aggressor, independent of alliance response timelines. Like France's Force de Frappe, C-MAD provides sovereign deterrence that cannot be withdrawn by allies or delayed by political deliberation.
Vilnius 35km from Belarus, Kaliningrad 100km away—proximity requires rapid-response capability. Small territory enables comprehensive launcher dispersal. 1,500km strike range covers Russian Western Military District from any launch point. Distributed underground storage in rural areas provides survivable arsenal. Geographic distribution of a set of production facilities ensures no single target can eliminate industrial capacity.