Executive Summary
Baltic Spy Satellites a trilateral Estonia-Latvia-Lithuania program establishing sovereign space-based ISR capability independent of allied sharing. Constellation of 6 satellites—3 SAR (all-weather, day/night, 25cm resolution) and 3 optical (sub-meter visible spectrum)—provides persistent coverage of Kaliningrad, Belarus border, and Western Military District with 4-hour average revisit time. Program follows Finland/ICEYE model (€158M for 3 SAR satellites) and Ukraine-Czechia Suziria model (joint development). Total investment €150-200M shared across three nations (~€50-70M each). Leverages Lithuanian laser expertise, Estonian space entrepreneurship, and Latvian communications capabilities. Includes distributed ground station network across all three nations for resilience. Integrates with NATO space architecture and EU IRIS² program. Sovereign tasking authority ensures priority access during crisis without dependency on commercial providers or allied sharing latency.
Transforms Baltic states from ISR consumers to ISR producers; Enables real-time tracking of Russian military movements; Supports AI targeting systems with sovereign sensor feed; Creates foundation for Baltic space industry; Demonstrates NATO burden-sharing; Reduces dependency on US/Allied imagery sharing
In short: 6 satellites (3 SAR + 3 optical); 25cm SAR / sub-meter optical resolution; 4-hour revisit time; Sovereign Baltic tasking authority; All-weather day/night capability; €50-70M per nation (shared cost); Independence from allied sharing latency
The Problem
The Baltic states face unique ISR challenges: Kaliningrad—hosting Iskander missiles and S-400 batteries—lies just 50km from Lithuanian territory; the Belarus border stretches 680km requiring constant monitoring; Russian Western Military District can mass forces within 48-72 hours. Current Baltic access to satellite imagery depends on ad-hoc NATO sharing with 3-5 day latency, or commercial contracts where providers may restrict access during crisis. Ukraine demonstrated that commercial satellites see everything Russia does—the question is whether you have guaranteed access. Finnish intelligence using ICEYE satellites directly prepared strikes causing billions in damage to Russian forces. Without sovereign constellation, Baltic states cannot guarantee persistent overhead coverage when needed most.
No sovereign satellite reconnaissance capability across all three Baltic states; Dependency on NATO sharing with 3-5 day request latency; Commercial imagery contracts lack guaranteed crisis access; No SAR capability for Baltic weather (cloud cover, darkness); No dedicated ground station infrastructure; Limited ability to task satellites for priority targets; Current commercial integration ad-hoc rather than systematic; No Baltic space industrial base for sustainment
Without action: During crisis, Baltic states may lose overhead imagery access precisely when needed most; Russian movements between Kaliningrad and Belarus undetected during critical windows; Cannot support national AI targeting systems with sovereign sensor feed; Continued dependency on allied goodwill for basic situational awareness; Miss opportunity to build Baltic space industry; Fall behind Nordic neighbors (Finland: €158M ICEYE deal; Sweden: ICEYE customer)
Lithuanian Context
Lithuania contributes ~€50-70M (one-third share) for sovereign overhead ISR capability covering Kaliningrad (50km away) and Belarus border (680km). Transforms Lithuania from ISR consumer dependent on 3-5 day NATO sharing to ISR producer with <2-hour tasking capability. Directly supports AI targeting system with sovereign orbital sensor feed. Leverages Lithuanian laser production expertise for satellite payload components. Builds foundation for Lithuanian space industry. Demonstrates NATO burden-sharing and Baltic solidarity.
Constellation optimized for Baltic priority coverage: Kaliningrad Oblast (Iskander, S-400, Baltic Fleet), Belarus border and military installations, Russian Western Military District, Suwałki Gap corridor, Baltic Sea maritime domain. 4-6 hour revisit enables tracking of Russian military movements and detecting buildup indicators. SAR capability essential for Baltic weather—200+ overcast days annually in region.